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Saving Facebook 
James Grimmelmann!
ABSTRACT: This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the 
law and policy of privacy on social network sites, using Facebook as its 
principal example. It explains how Facebook users socialize on the site, why 
they misunderstand the risks involved, and how their privacy suffers as a 
result. Facebook offers a socially compelling platform that also facilitates 
peer-to-peer privacy violations: users harming each others’ privacy interests. 
These two facts are inextricably linked; people use Facebook with the goal of 
sharing information about themselves. Policymakers cannot make Facebook 
completely safe, but they can help people use it safely. 
 
The Article makes this case by presenting a rich, factually grounded 
description of the social dynamics of privacy on Facebook. It then uses that 
description to evaluate a dozen possible policy interventions. Unhelpful 
interventions—such as mandatory data portability and bans on underage 
use—fail because they also fail to engage with key aspects of how and why 
people use social network sites. On the other hand, the potentially helpful 
interventions—such as a strengthened public-disclosure tort and a right to 
opt out completely—succeed because they do engage with these social 
dynamics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The first task of technology law is always to understand how people 
actually use the technology. Consider the phenomenon called “ghost riding 
the whip.” The Facebook page of the “Ghost Riding the Whip Association” 
links to a video of two young men jumping out of a moving car and dancing 
around on it as it rolls on, now driverless. If this sounds horribly dangerous, 
that’s because it is. At least two people have been killed ghost riding,1 and 
the best-known of the hundreds of ghost-riding videos posted online shows a 
ghost rider being run over by his own car.2
Policymakers could respond to such obviously risky behavior in two 
ways. One way—the wrong way—would treat ghost riders as passive victims. 
Surely, sane people would never voluntarily dance around on the hood of a 
moving car. There must be something wrong with the car that induces them 
to ghost ride on it. Maybe cars should come with a “NEVER EXIT A 
MOVING CAR” sticker on the driver-side window. If drivers ignore the 
stickers, maybe any car with doors and windows that open should be 
declared unreasonably dangerous. And so on. The problem with this entire 
way of thinking is that it sees only the car, and not the driver who lets go of 
the wheel. Cars don’t ghost ride the whip; people ghost ride the whip. 
 
To protect drivers from the dangers of ghost riding, policymakers would 
be better off focusing on the ghost riders themselves. What motivates them? 
Why do they underestimate the risks? When they get hurt, what went wrong? 
Engaging with ghost riders’ worldviews would suggest modest, incremental 
policies appropriate to the ways in which ghost riders use automotive 
technology. Sensible responses would include reducing ghost riding’s allure, 
helping its practitioners appreciate the dangers, and tweaking car design to 
help drivers regain control quickly.3
This Article applies this principle to a different problem of risky 
technology use: privacy on Facebook. Think again about the Ghost Riding 
 The key principle is to understand the 
social dynamics of technology use, and tailor policy interventions to fit. 
 
 1. See Garance Burke, ‘Look Ma—No Hands!,’ STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec. 30, 2006, at 
27. A Centers for Disease Control study of the related practice of car surfing—riding on the 
outside of a car, but one with a driver—found reports of fifty-eight deaths and an additional 
forty-one injuries over an eighteen-year period. See Injuries Resulting from Car Surfing 1990–2008, 
57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1121, 1121 (2008). 
 2. Ghost Ride the Whip, FUNNYORDIE, http://www.funnyordie.com/videos/428d3416c0. 
 3. For example, the videos and press accounts suggest that high-speed, showy ghost 
riding is much more dangerous than low-speed ghost riding in open, flat spaces. It’s also 
evident that ghost riding is a cultural phenomenon, united by two pro-ghost-riding rap songs, 
and that the videos are the key form of showing off. Thus, rather than trying to stamp out all 
ghost riding, safety-conscious police should focus on high-profile ghost riders posting online 
videos of themselves doing particularly unsafe tricks with fast-moving cars. Such videos are 
greater direct risks and are more appealing to potential copycats. 
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the Whip Association. Anyone with a Facebook account, including police 
and potential employers, can easily identify the two ghost riders by name. 
Not only did these men misunderstand the physical risks of ghost riding, 
they also misunderstood the privacy risks of Facebook. They’re not alone. 
Over a hundred million people have uploaded personally sensitive 
information to Facebook, and many of them have been badly burnt as a 
result. Jobs have been lost, reputations smeared, embarrassing secrets 
broadcast to the world. 
It’s temptingly easy to pin the blame for these problems entirely on 
Facebook. Easy—but wrong. Facebook isn’t a privacy carjacker, forcing its 
victims into compromising situations. It’s a carmaker, offering its users a 
flexible, valuable, socially compelling tool. Its users are the ones ghost riding 
the privacy whip, dancing around on the roof as they expose their personal 
information to the world. 
Thus, if we seek laws and policies that mitigate the privacy risks of 
Facebook and other social network sites, we need to go through the same 
social and psychological analysis. What motivates Facebook users? Why do 
they underestimate the privacy risks? When their privacy is violated, what 
went wrong? Responses that don’t engage with the answers to these 
questions can easily make matters worse. 
Consider, for example, technical controls: switches that users can flip to 
keep certain details from being shared in certain ways. Facebook is Exhibit A 
for the surprising ineffectiveness of technical controls. It has severe privacy 
problems and an admirably comprehensive privacy-protection architecture. 
The problem is that it’s extraordinarily hard—indeed, often impossible—to 
translate ambiguous and contested user norms of information-sharing into 
hard-edged software rules. As soon as the technical controls get in the way of 
socializing, users disable and misuse them. This story is typical; other 
seemingly attractive privacy “protections” miss essential social dynamics. 
Thus, this Article provides the first careful and comprehensive analysis 
of the law and policy of privacy on social network sites, using Facebook as its 
principal example. The rest of Part I provides the necessary background. 
After clearing up the necessary terminology, it provides a brief history and 
technical overview of Facebook. Part II then presents a rich, factually 
grounded description of the social dynamics of privacy on Facebook. Part 
II.A explains how social network sites allow people to express themselves, 
form meaningful relationships, and see themselves as valued members of a 
community. Part II.B shows how these social motivations are closely bound 
up with the heuristics that people use to evaluate privacy risks, heuristics that 
often lead them to think that Facebook activities are more private than they 
actually are. Part II.C finishes by examining the privacy harms that result. 
The message of Part II is that most of Facebook’s privacy problems are the 
result of neither incompetence nor malice; instead, they’re natural 
consequences of the ways that people enthusiastically use Facebook. 
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Having described the social dynamics of privacy on Facebook, the 
Article applies that description in Parts III and IV, distinguishing helpful 
from unhelpful policy responses. Part III is negative; it shows how policy 
prescriptions can go badly wrong when they don’t pay attention to these 
social dynamics: 
 
" Leaving matters up to “the market” doesn’t produce an optimal 
outcome; users’ social and cognitive misunderstandings of the 
privacy risks of Facebook won’t disappear anytime soon. 
 
" “Better” privacy policies are irrelevant; users don’t pay attention 
to them when making decisions about their behavior on 
Facebook. 
 
" “Better” technical controls make matters worse; they cram 
subtle and complicated human judgments into ill-fitting digital 
boxes. 
 
" Treating Facebook as a commercial data collector misconstrues 
the problem; users are voluntarily, even enthusiastically, asking 
the site to share their personal information widely. 
 
" Trying to restrict access to Facebook is a Sisyphean task; it has 
passionate, engaged users who will fight back against 
restrictions. 
 
" Giving users “ownership” over the information that they enter 
on Facebook is the worst idea of all; it empowers them to run 
roughshod over others’ privacy. 
 
Part IV, on the other hand, is positive; it shows how proposals that do 
engage with Facebook’s social dynamics can sometimes do some good. Each 
of these proposals seeks to reduce the gap between what users expect to 
happen to their personal information and what actually happens to it: 
 
" Not everything posted on Facebook is public. Users shouldn’t 
automatically lose their rights of privacy in information solely 
because it’s been put on Facebook somewhere. 
 
" Users’ good names are valuable. There’s a commercial 
reputational interest in one’s Facebook persona, and using that 
persona for marketing purposes without consent should be 
actionable. 
 
A1 - GRIMMELMANN_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:44 PM 
1142 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
" Opt-outs need to be meaningful. People who don’t sign up for 
Facebook, or who sign up but then decide to quit, deserve to 
have their choices not to participate respected. 
 
" Unpredictable changes are dangerous. Changes that pull the 
rug out from under users’ expectations about privacy should be 
considered unfair trade practices. 
 
" Strip-mining social networks is bad for the social environment. 
Bribing users to use a social network site—for example, by 
giving them rewards when more of their friends sign up—
creates unhealthy chain-letter dynamics that subvert 
relationships. 
 
" Education needs to reach the right audiences. Targeted efforts 
to explain a few key facts about social-network-site privacy in 
culturally appropriate ways could help head off some of the 
more common privacy goofs users make. 
 
Finally, Part V concludes with a brief message of optimism. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
I’ll refer to Facebook and its competitors as “social network sites.” This 
phrase captures the idea that Facebook and its competitors are websites 
designed to be used by people connected in “a social network,” a term that 
sociologists use to describe the structure of interactions within a group of 
people.4 I’ll rely on danah boyd5
[Social network sites are] web-based services that allow individuals 
to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded 
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a 
connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system.
 and Nicole Ellison’s definition of “social 
network sites”: 
6
 
 4. See generally LINTON C. FREEMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
(2004) (describing the history of “social network analysis” in social science). People sometimes 
refer to Facebook as a “social network,” but that usage introduces an ambiguity whenever we 
want to distinguish between the map (Facebook) and the territory (the relationships among 
people). 
 
 5. I follow boyd’s preferred orthography in writing her name without capital letters. See 
danah michele boyd, What’s in a Name?, DANAH.ORG, http://www.danah.org/name.html. 
 6. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 13(1), art. 11 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/ 
vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html. boyd and Ellison use “social network site” rather than “social 
networking site” because “participants are not necessarily ‘networking’ or looking to meet new 
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This definition emphasizes the explicit representation of connections among 
users. I don’t just write nice things about you on the site; I use the site’s tools 
to create a standardized link from my profile to yours. Social network sites 
make the graph structure of social networks explicit; users are nodes and 
connections are links.7
The definition’s three prongs correspond to three important aspects of 
the social interactions that such sites enable. The first prong—profiles—
emphasizes identity: users create profiles that represent them. The second 
prong—contacts—emphasizes relationships: users establish one-to-one 
connections with others. The third prong—traversing lists of contacts—
emphasizes community: users occupy a specific place among their peers. 
(Loosely speaking, one could think of these aspects as corresponding to the 
first, second, and third persons: I, you, them.) I’ll use this tripartite structure 
repeatedly when discussing what people do on social network sites and what 
privacy on them looks like. 
 This design choice has profound implications for the 
social interactions that take place on such sites. 
I’ll use the term “contact” to describe a user with whom one has an 
explicit link on a social network site; it’s more neutral about the nature of 
the relationship than the terms used by many sites, such as “friend.” The set 
of one’s contacts on a social network site is well-defined; all other users are 
either contacts or not. On some sites, such as Facebook, being a contact is a 
symmetrical relationship; if I’m a contact of yours, you’re a contact of mine. 
On other sites, such as LiveJournal, the relationship can be asymmetrical; I 
can add you as a contact without you adding me as one.8 Some sites let users 
annotate their links so that they convey more information than the binary 
contact/not-a-contact distinction; for example, Orkut lets users indicate that 
they are “fans” of particular contacts.9
The term “social graph” is commonly used to refer to the entire 
network of users and explicit contact links on a social network site, or, by 
metonymy, to the idealized network of users and explicit contact links that 
would exist if the same site stored all significant human relationships.
 
10
 
people; instead, they are primarily communicating with people who are already a part of their 
extended social network.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 
When we speak of a user’s “social network” in the context of a specific site, 
we usually mean something fuzzier and more subjective: the set of people 
with whom one interacts on the site, even if infrequently, and whether or 
 7. See generally ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 16–18 
(2002) (explaining the usefulness of graph theory in modeling real-world social networks). 
 8. Graph theorists would say that a social network site could have either directed or 
undirected links. 
 9. orkut Help, “Icons”: About Fans, ORKUT.COM, http://www.google.com/support/orkut/ 
bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=11766. 
 10. See, e.g., Brad Fitzpatrick, Thoughts on the Social Graph, BRADFITZ.COM, http://bradfitz. 
com/social-graph-problem/ (Aug. 17, 2007). 
A1 - GRIMMELMANN_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:44 PM 
1144 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
not they are listed as contacts. Facebook confuses matters by referring to a 
“network” of all users associated with a given institution—e.g., a user’s 
“Barnett College Network” is the set of the user’s contacts who have 
indicated that they are affiliated with Barnett College. Social network sites 
are only one kind of “social software,” defined by Clay Shirky as “software 
that supports group communications.”11
B. FACEBOOK 
 
Social network sites date to the late 1990s. Some early sites have since 
closed,12 but others, like LiveJournal, are still successful today.13 Social 
network sites started to enter American mass popular consciousness with 
Friendster in 2002.14 A series of technical problems and community-
management missteps kept Friendster from fully exploiting its extensive 
press coverage.15 Instead, MySpace (over 100 million users16) and Facebook 
(over 175 million users17) ate Friendster’s lunch. There are many other 
social network sites, but I’ll draw most of my examples from these four.18
Facebook was created by an ambitious Harvard student, and it shows.
 
19 
The site, launched in February 2004, took its name (originally 
“TheFacebook.com”) and inspiration from the books of student headshot 
photos and basic biographical data distributed to Harvard students to tell 
them about each other. Within a day of its creation, 1,200 students had 
signed up; within a month, half the undergraduate population had joined.20
 
 11. Clay Shirky, Social Software and the Politics of Groups, NETWORKS, ECON., & CULTURE 
MAILING LIST, 
 
It rapidly expanded to provide “networks” for students at other colleges; by 
September 2005, Facebook claimed that eighty-five percent of all students at 
the 882 colleges it supported had Facebook profiles, sixty percent of whom 
http://www.shirky.com/writings/group_politics.html (Mar. 9, 2003). Other 
kinds of social software include blogs, wikis, and media-sharing sites, like Flickr and YouTube. 
 12. See boyd & Ellison, supra note 6. 
 13. See Statistics, LIVEJOURNAL, http://www.livejournal.com/stats.bml (claiming over 2.2 
million active accounts). 
 14. danah boyd, Friendster and Publicly Articulated Social Networks, CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS 
& COMPUTER SYS. 2 (2004), http://www.danah.org/papers/CHI2004Friendster.pdf. 
 15. danah boyd, Friendster Lost Steam. Is MySpace Just a Fad?, DANAH.ORG, 
http://www.danah.org/papers/FriendsterMySpaceEssay.html (Mar. 21, 2006). 
 16. Catherine Holahan, MySpace: My Portal?, BUS. WK., June 12, 2008, http://www. 
businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2008/tc20080612_801233.htm. 
 17. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics. 
 18. See DIGFOOT, http://www.digfoot.com/ (providing a directory of over 3700 social 
network sites). 
 19. John Markoff, Who Found the Bright Idea?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at C1 (discussing 
competing claims to the “original college social networking system”). 
 20. Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, July 25, 2007, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia. 
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logged in daily.21 Today, Facebook is open to anyone with an email address 
who is willing to claim to be thirteen or older.22
Facebook’s roots as a college-based service are still visible in the key role 
it assigns to Networks. A “Network” is a collection of users with a school, 
workplace, or region in common.
 
23 Some of the privacy settings that 
Facebook offers allow users to restrict access to certain information to 
members of one of their Networks.24 To gain access to a college or company 
network, you need an email address associated with the relevant 
institution.25 For example, only people with an @barnett.edu address could 
access profiles in the (hypothetical) Barnett College Network. Backing up 
this rule, the terms of use repeatedly forbid signing up with false 
information.26
Facebook’s pace of innovation is so blisteringly fast that it’s not 
uncommon to log into the site and see that part of the interface has 
changed overnight to offer a new feature.
 
27 Each user’s profile page has a 
“Wall” where other users can post messages.28 There’s also a private, email-
like “Message” system,29 and the “Poke” system, whose only message is “You 
were poked by ____.”30 Users can also send each other “Gifts” (64x64 pixel 
icons) for one dollar each.31
 
 21. Michael Arrington, 85% of College Students Use Facebook, TECHCRUNCH, http://www. 
techcrunch.com/2005/09/07/85-of-college-students-use-facebook/ (Sept. 7, 2005). 
 There’s a photo-sharing feature, imaginatively 
 22. Carolyn Abram, Welcome to Facebook, Everyone, FACEBOOK BLOG, http://blog.facebook. 
com/blog.php?blog_id=company&m=9&y=2006 (Sept. 26, 2006); Terms of Use, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (Sept. 23, 2008). 
 23. See Networks on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.new.facebook.com/networks/ 
networks.php (listing the Networks that Facebook offers). 
 24. See Facebook Principles, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php?ref=pf (“Your 
profile information, as well as your name, email and photo, are displayed to people in the 
networks specified in your privacy settings . . . .”). 
 25. Networks: Joining or Leaving a Network, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help. 
php?page=799 (follow “How do I join a supported Facebook network?” hyperlink). 
 26. Terms of Use, supra note 22 (“[Y]ou agree to . . . provide accurate, current and 
complete information about you [and not to] misrepresent . . . your affiliation with any person 
or entity [and not to] create a false identity on the Service or the Site.”). Facebook applies this 
policy rigorously, almost to the point of absurdity. For example, it banned an Australian rock 
critic because it didn’t believe that she was really named Elmo Keep. Asher Moses, Banned for 
Keeps on Facebook for Odd Name, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.smh.com. 
au/news/technology/biztech/banned-for-keeps-on-facebook-for-odd-name/2008/09/25/ 
1222217399252.html. 
 27. MySpace has also been an aggressive innovator. It’s added, among other things, group 
pages, instant messaging, video-sharing, classified ads, and an application API. MYSPACE.COM, 
http://www.myspace.com/. 
 28. Wall, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=443. 
 29. Messages and Inbox, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=406. 
 30. Pokes, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=407. 
 31. Gifts, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=410. For an example of a 
gift icon, see http://static.ak.fbcdn.net/images/gifts/532.png. See also Steve Silberman, The 
Mother of All Happy Macs Gives the Gift of Web 2.0, WIRED, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.wired.com/ 
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named “Photos,” with a clever tagging system: click on a face in a photo—
even one posted by someone else—and you can enter the person’s name.32
All of these activities generate a rich stream of event notifications. In 
September 2006, Facebook made that stream visible to users.
 
If it’s someone on Facebook, the name becomes a link to his or her profile. 
33 Each user’s 
homepage displayed a “News Feed”—a list of the most recent notifications 
from his or her contacts.34 You’d see that Seth’s relationship status changed, 
that Gwen gave Marcia a gift, that Fred wrote on Shari’s Wall, and so on. The 
announcement of the change generated an uproar over the panoptic privacy 
implications. Facebook at first defended itself by saying that the information 
had always been available; users could have looked at the changed profiles 
directly.35 Then it partially backed off, allowing users to exclude various 
items from showing up in others’ News Feeds.36
Facebook’s most technologically interesting feature is its “Platform,” 
which developers can use to create “Applications” that plug seamlessly into 
the Facebook site.
 
37 The Platform provides developers an interface to issue 
instructions to Facebook and gather information from it,38 along with a 
custom markup language so that the application’s notifications and 
interface are shown to users with the Facebook look and feel.39 There are 
now thousands of Applications, a few of which are runaway successes.40
 
 
Some of the more notable Applications include: 
 
print/gadgets/mac/magazine/15-11/ps_macicons (profiling the designer of Facebook Gift 
icons). 
 32. Photos, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=412. 
 33. Susan Kinzie & Yuki Noguchi, In Online Social Club, Sharing Is the Point Until It Goes Too 
Far, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1. 
 34. News Feed, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=408. 
 35. But see danah boyd, Facebook’s “Privacy Trainwreck”: Exposure, Invasion, and Drama, 
APOPHENIA, http://www.danah.org/papers/FacebookAndPrivacy.html (Sept. 8, 2006) (“What 
happened with Facebook was not about a change in the bit state—it was about people feeling 
icky.”) 
 36. Antone Gonsalves, Facebook Founder Apologizes in Privacy Flap; Users Given More Control, 
INFO. WK., Sept. 8, 2006, http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/ebusiness/show 
Article.jhtml?articleID=192700574. 
 37. Build Social Applications on Facebook Platform, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, http://developers. 
facebook.com/. 
 38. API, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS WIKI, http://wiki.developers.facebook.com/index.php/ 
API. 
 39. FBML, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS WIKI, http://wiki.developers.facebook.com/index. 
php/FBML. 
 40. Tim O’Reilly, Good News, Bad News About Facebook Application Market: Long Tail Rules, 
O’REILLY RADAR, http://radar.oreilly.com/2007/10/good-news-bad-news-about-faceb.html 
(Oct. 5, 2007). 
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" Lexulous, a hugely popular (and possibly infringing41) 
implementation of Scrabble;42
 
 
" Zombies, in which each user controls a zombie that can bite 
other users’ zombies;43
 
 
" Causes, which lets users display their social commitments, find 
other users who support the same causes, and donate money;44
 
 
and 
" Quiz Creator, which asks, “Ever wanted your own Facebook 
app? Too lazy to code? This app’s for you! Use this app to create 
your very own quiz app by filling out a few easy forms!”45
 
 
Applications can be connected to almost every aspect of one’s Facebook 
experience. For example, Causes writes to your profile page and News Feed, 
whereas Zombies builds a list of your contacts so that you can decide whom 
to bite. Facebook now sports an extensive set of options to let users decide 
what personal data Applications can see and what aspects of their Facebook 
presence Applications are allowed to spam with messages.46
In November 2007, Facebook unveiled Beacon, a system that allows 
third-party websites to send event notifications to Facebook. For example, 
Epicurious.com might send a message to Facebook that an Epicurious.com 
user has reviewed a recipe.
 
47 Through clever programming,48
 
 41. See Complaint at 1, Hasbro, Inc. v. RJ Softwares, No. 08 CIV 6567 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 
2008), 
 if the user is 
also logged into Facebook, the message will be associated with her and will 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/4083968/hasbro-v-scrabulous. 
 42. See Lexulous, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/applications/Scrabulous/30521 
70175. 
 43. Zombies, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/applications/Zombies/2341504841. 
 44. Causes, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/applications/Causes/2318966938. 
 45. Quiz Creator, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/applications/Quiz_Creator/6016 
992457. 
 46. See Privacy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=419 (listing privacy 
options available to Facebook users). 
 47. Press Release, Facebook, Leading Websites Offer Facebook Beacon for Social 
Distribution (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=9166. One of 
Facebook’s Beacon partners is Blockbuster; the process of sending notifications about video 
rentals through Beacon violates the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000). See 
James Grimmelmann, Facebook and the VPPA: Uh-Oh, THE LABORATORIUM, http://laboratorium. 
net/archive/2007/12/10/facebook_and_the_vppa_uhoh (Dec. 10, 2007); see also Complaint at 
3, Lane v. Facebook, No. 5:2008cv03845 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008) (on file with the Iowa Law 
Review) (alleging that Beacon and Facebook violated several statutes, including the Video 
Privacy Protection Act). 
 48. See Jay Goldman, Deconstructing Facebook Beacon JavaScript, RADIANT CORE, http://www. 
radiantcore.com/blog/archives/23/11/2007/deconstructingfacebookbeaconjavascript (Nov. 
23, 2007) (documenting the iframe/cookie-injction mechanism by which Beacon works). 
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show up in her News Feed.49 (An additional Facebook program, “Social 
Ads,” then offers the third-party affiliates the option of showing related ads 
to her contacts when they see the notification in her News Feed.50) Beacon 
launched with a clearly ineffective opt-out: a transient pop-up window 
treated inaction as consent, and there was no way to disable Beacon 
prospectively except on a site-by-site basis as each site tried to send 
notifications.51 After dealing with yet another public outcry, Facebook 
implemented better opt-out procedures.52 Facebook is currently in the 
process of launching “Facebook Connect,” which allows other websites to 
embed Facebook features like profiles and friends lists.53
The most important distinction between Facebook and its most 
prominent competitor, MySpace, is that Facebook has fashioned itself 
around the institution of college.
 
54 There are plenty of college students on 
MySpace55 and plenty of non-college students on Facebook,56 but 
Facebook’s cultural norms reflect the collegiate experience in a way that 
MySpace’s don’t.57 The difference is also visible in their appearance. 
Facebook’s user interface is tightly controlled; while users and Applications 
can add text and pictures to a profile, these elements can only appear in 
Facebook-approved locations and sizes. MySpace, on the other hand, allows 
users nearly limitless freedom to customize their profile page’s design by 
entering raw HTML.58
 
 49. How Does Beacon Work, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/beacon/faq.php. 
 The result is that Facebook pages have the clean lines 
 50. Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=409. 
 51. Ethan Zuckerman, Facebook Changes the Norms for Web Purchasing and Privacy, MY 
HEART’S IN ACCRA, http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2007/11/15/facebook-changes-
the-norms-for-web-purchasing-and-privacy/ (Nov. 15, 2007). 
 52. Louise Story & Brad Stone, Facebook Retreats on Online Tracking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 
2007, at C1; Mark Zuckerberg, Thoughts on Beacon, FACEBOOK BLOG, http://blog.facebook.com/ 
blog.php?post=7584397130 (Dec. 5, 2007). 
 53. See Facebook Connect, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, http://developers.facebook.com/ 
connect.php. If you asked me to pick the next Facebook feature to cause a massive privacy 
implosion, I’d guess Connect, which incorporates the most dangerous features of both Platform 
(potentially untrustworthy third parties) and Beacon (context violations). The integration with 
other sites also risks confusing users by making it harder to understand who has control over 
their personal information and where it’s going. 
 54. danah boyd, Viewing American Class Divisions Through Facebook and MySpace, DANAH.ORG, 
http://www.danah.org/papers/essays/ClassDivisions.html (June 24, 2007). 
 55. Eszter Hargittai, Whose Space? Differences Among Users and Non-Users of Social Network Sites, 
J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 13(1), art. 14 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/ 
hargittai.html. 
 56. See John Schwartz, 73 and Loaded with Friends on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, § 9, 
at 1. 
 57. boyd, supra note 54. 
 58. See Dan Perkel, Copy and Paste Literacy: Literacy Practices in the Production of a MySpace 
Profile 5–8, http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~dperkel/media/dperkel_literacymyspace.pdf 
(2006). 
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of a modernized college dorm; MySpace pages are often hideous but self-
expressive like a sticker-laden high-school locker.59
This Article will primarily discuss the social dynamics of social-network-
site use among young people (roughly, those under thirty) in Anglophone 
countries. One reason for this limit is a paucity of sources in translation. 
Another reason is that there are substantial demographic variations in social-
network-site usage, the causes and consequences of which are not well 
understood. A study of college students found that women are more likely to 
use social network sites than men are and that Hispanics were more likely to 
use MySpace and less likely to use Facebook than whites were.
 
60 Similarly, 
the United States-based Orkut never caught on big at home, but its 
popularity in Brazil has been a springboard to success in Latin America and 
Asia.61
II. THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF PRIVACY ON FACEBOOK 
 It may be possible to apply the lessons of this Article to other 
countries and cultures, but in keeping with this Article’s thesis, such 
applications should be grounded in careful study of local patterns of social-
network-site use. 
Facebook knows an immense amount about its users. A fully filled-out 
Facebook profile contains about forty pieces of recognizably personal 
information, including name; birthday; political and religious views; online 
and offline contact information; gender, sexual preference, and relationship 
status; favorite books, movies, and so on; educational and employment 
history; and, of course, picture. Facebook then offers multiple tools for users 
to search out and add potential contacts.62
The profiles and links are only the beginning. Consider again the 
features and Applications described above. Each of them serves as a conduit 
for information-sharing: 
 By the time you’re done, 
Facebook has a reasonably comprehensive snapshot both of who you are and 
of whom you know. 
 
 
 59. See Ze Frank, Ugly, Designers, MySpace, Ugly, Ugly Song, Mushy Peas, Momma, Happy 
Birthday Becky, THE SHOW, http://www.zefrank.com/theshow/archives/2006/07/071406.html 
(July 14, 2006) (“In MySpace, millions of people have opted out of pre-made templates that 
‘work’ in exchange for ugly. Ugly when compared to pre-existing notions of taste is a bummer. 
But ugly as a representation of mass experimentation and learning is pretty damn cool.”); boyd, 
supra note 15 (describing how MySpace’s lack of “parsability” adds to its “subcultural capital”). 
 60. Hargittai, supra note 55. 
 61. Olga Kharif, Google’s Orkut: A World of Ambition, BUS. WK., Oct. 8, 2007, http://www. 
businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2007/tc2007107_530965.htm. 
 62. See Friends, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=441 (suggest 
contact to current contacts); Find People You Know on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook. 
com/findfriends.php (search for users); Florin Ratiu, People You May Know, FACEBOOK BLOG, 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=15610312130 (May 1, 2008) (get suggestions from 
Facebook). 
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" Wall posts can contain information about the poster (one 
contact who posted on my Wall mentioned an upcoming trip to 
Pisa), about the postee (another asked about my beard), or 
about both (a third mentioned a course we’d taken together in 
college). 
 
" If I Poke you, it indicates that I’m online, and I’m thinking 
about you. 
 
" The payment infrastructure required by Gifts provides stronger 
links between a profile and offline identities; choosing one Gift 
over another (e.g., a “Get Well” balloon rather than a lipstick 
kiss or a dreidel) has a meaning that at least one other person 
understands, as does the personalized message accompanying it. 
 
" If I upload and tag a Photo of you, it documents what you look 
like and someplace that you’ve been. It also documents that I 
know you and permits a reasonable inference that I was the 
photographer. 
 
" Each game of Lexulous you play gives some hints about your 
vocabulary. Playing a hundred games of Lexulous also says 
something different about your personality than having a Level 
8 Zombie does. 
 
" Your list of Causes tells others what principles are meaningful to 
you. 
 
" Quiz Creator may not necessarily say much about the people 
who write quizzes, but the whole point of answering a quiz is to 
reveal things about your knowledge, beliefs, and preferences. 
 
Put it all together, and your Facebook presence says quite a lot about 
you.63
 
 63. See, e.g., Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in 
Online Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 20, 27–31 (2008) (finding that two-thirds 
of students surveyed indicated “romantic status and sexual orientation” on their profiles and 
half indicated their religion). See generally danah boyd & Jeffrey Heer, Profiles as Conversation: 
Networked Identity Performance on Friendster, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAWAI’I INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES (2006), 
 Now, it’s true that there’s not that much sensitive information in the 
fact that I have only a Level 1 Ensign Zombie (especially once I add that I 
play Zombies only for research purposes). But the law often treats many of 
http://www.danah.org/papers/HICSS2006.pdf 
(discussing how people present their identities through profiles). 
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the other facts in a typical profile—including religious affiliation,64 sexual 
orientation,65 group memberships,66 events attended,67 and appearance68—
as personal, and bars attempts to discover or disclose them.69
This flood of personal information presents us with a puzzle: Why do so 
many Facebook users entrust it with so much personal information? The 
answer is that people have social reasons to participate on social network sites, 
and these social motivations explain both why users value Facebook 
notwithstanding its well-known privacy risks and why they systematically 
underestimate those risks. Facebook provides users with a forum in which 
they can craft social identities, forge reciprocal relationships, and 
accumulate social capital. These are important, even primal, human desires, 
whose immediacy can trigger systematic biases in the mechanisms that 
people use to evaluate privacy risks. 
 Now multiply 
this depth of information by almost two hundred million users. 
A. MOTIVATIONS 
People have used computers to socialize for a long time,70 and new 
forms of social software take off when they offer users something socially 
compelling.71
 
 64. See, e.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 86–89 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(preliminarily enjoining an employer from using a personality test that included religious 
questions). 
 In this Section, I’ll detail three ways in which Facebook 
scratches its users’ social itches. Each drives users to release personal 
information; each depends on the personal information of other users. 
 65. See DoD Instruction No. 1304.26, § E2.2.8.1 (2007) (“Applicants for enlistment, 
appointment, or induction [into the U. S. military] shall not be asked or required to reveal 
their sexual orientation . . . .”). 
 66. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–67 (protecting NAACP 
membership lists against compelled disclosure). 
 67. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43176, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007) (monitoring the New York Police Department’s 
compliance with a consent decree and guidelines preventing certain forms of police 
photography and videotaping at protests). 
 68. See Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 474 
(1999) (preventing public disclosure of a mug shot). 
 69. See, e.g., Andrew B. Serwin, Privacy 3.0—The Principle of Proportionality 27–30 (2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000& 
context=andrew_serwin (classifying such information in “Tier 1,” the most sensitive of four 
categories of personal information and the one requiring the greatest legal protection). 
 70. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1993) (detailing the author’s experiences participating in early online 
communities). 
 71. See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAM ASPRAY, COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF THE 
INFORMATION MACHINE 294–96 (1996) (describing the rapid adoption of email in the 1970s); 
boyd, supra note 15 (“Social technologies succeed when they fit into the social lives and 
practices of those who engage with the technology.”). 
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1. Identity 
The first social factor is the easiest to see: a social network site lets you 
say who you are. Erving Goffman observed that daily social interactions are 
full of attempts, large and small, to convince others to accept your claims 
about yourself.72 Online interactions are no different; you can use 
everything from your chat nickname to your home page to influence how 
other people think of you.73
Social network sites offer a gloriously direct tool for what Goffman calls 
“impression management”: the profile page.
 
74 Just as your choice of clothing 
and hairstyle signals how you think of yourself (and want others to think of 
you), so does your choice of profile photo.75 Many users choose to display 
the most flattering photographs of themselves that they can.76 Each 
additional datum is a strategic revelation, one more daub of paint in your 
self-portrait. Facebook’s profile fields aren’t a list of the things most 
important to its users; they’re a list of the things its users most want to say 
about themselves. The fact that half of the “Personal” fields on a Facebook 
profile involve favorite forms of media isn’t an expression of consumerism; 
instead, it lets users communicate “prestige, differentiation, authenticity, 
and theatrical persona” using a common cultural language.77
These messages aren’t universal; they’re self-consciously coded for 
particular audiences. Since Friendster didn’t allow users under eighteen, 
sixteen-year-olds would list their age as sixty-one, a code understood by other 
teens.
 
78 Burning Man attendees, on the other hand, listed their festival 
nicknames on their profiles, names that would mean nothing if you weren’t 
also a “Burner.”79 The ultimate example of this phenomenon—a literally 
false, but still intelligible, profile—is the Fakester: a profile for a non-existent 
person80 or an unauthorized profile claiming to be a celebrity.81
 
 72. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) 
(applying a “dramaturgical” perspective to daily social interactions). 
 While some 
 73. See PATRICIA WALLACE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 28–37 (1999) (examining 
the ways in which Internet users manage their online personas). 
 74. GOFFMAN, supra note 72 at 80. 
 75. See 65 Ways to Post a Facebook Profile Picture, BUZZ CANUCK, http://buzzcanuck.typepad. 
com/agentwildfire/2007/08/65-ways-to-post.html (Aug. 30, 2007). 
 76. See Kristy Ward, The Psychology of Facebook, THE CHARLATAN, http://www.charlatan.ca/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20014&Itemid=151 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
 77. Hugo Liu, Social Network Profiles as Taste Performances, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 
13(1), art. 13 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/liu.html. 
 78. boyd & Heer, supra note 63, § 3.1. 
 79. Id. § 2.1. 
 80. See, e.g., Beer Goggles Egads, FRIENDSTER, http://profiles.friendster.com/8032093. See 
generally danah boyd, None of This Is Real: Identity and Participation in Friendster, in STRUCTURES OF 
PARTICIPATION IN DIGITAL CULTURE 132 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2007), http://www.danah.org/ 
papers/NoneOfThisIsReal.pdf (describing the Fakester phenomenon). 
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Fakesters were creations of convenience (e.g. “Barnett College”), others 
were more expressively creative.82
Thus, social-network-site profiles are wholly social artifacts: controlled 
impressions for a specific audience, as much performative as informative.
 
83 
Every letter and pixel of Barack Obama’s Facebook profile was carefully 
crafted to send the precise messages that his campaign wanted to send.84 I 
should add that profiles aren’t just expressive of identity; they’re also 
constitutive of it. You are the person you present yourself as, to your 
contacts, in the context of the site, using the site’s lexicon of profile 
questions. Social software has facilitated identity play for a long time,85 and 
the paper-doll aspect of a social-network-site profile encourages this 
dynamic.86
Identity construction isn’t limited to one’s profile; other 
communications also signal who you are. Joining a “Darfur Action Group” 
doesn’t just encourage your contacts to save Darfur; it also tells them that 
you’re the sort of person who cares about saving Darfur. Similarly, the 
comments other users leave on your profile become part of your own 
performance, albeit a part you can’t fully control.
 
87 (Friendster called its 
profile comments “Testimonials,” explicitly encouraging their use for 
reputation management.) Even your list of contacts makes statements about 
identity; on Facebook as in life, you’re known by the company you keep.88
 
 81. See Clifford J. Levy, A New Leader’s Mandate for Changing Little, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 
2008, at A12 (quoting the Russian president-elect as saying, “I found about 630 Dmitri 
Medvedevs” on Odnoklassniki, a Russian social network site) 
 
 82. boyd, supra note 80, at 148–49 (calling Fakesters “a public art form” and describing 
“positive feedback” as a consistent goal of Fakester creators). I personally like “Dave Sarfur” on 
Facebook. 
 83. See Alex Williams, Here I Am Taking My Own Picture, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 9, at 1 
(quoting experts describing “digital self-portraiture” on social network sites as “self-branding,” 
“theatrical,” and “role-playing”). 
 84. Barack Obama, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/barackobama. 
 85. See generally SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE 
INTERNET 178 (1995) (discussing the Internet’s impact on how people present themselves). 
 86. See danah boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in 
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 129 (David Buckingham  
ed., 2008), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/dmal.9780262524834.119 (“A 
MySpace profile can be seen as a form of digital body where individuals must write themselves 
into being.” (emphasis added)). 
 87. See danah boyd, Friends, Friendsters, and Top 8: Writing Community into Being on Social 
Network Sites, FIRST MONDAY, Dec. 2006, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index. 
php/fm/article/view/1418/1336. 
 88. See Judith Donath & danah boyd, Public Displays of Connection, BT TECH., Oct. 4, 2004, 
at 71, 77–78. 
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2. Relationship 
The second social factor is that a social network site lets you make new 
friends and deepen your connection to your current ones. Sharing personal 
information is a basic component of intimacy.89 Communications 
technologies have been connecting people since long before the Internet,90 
and many authors have noted the strength of online relationships.91
Some social network sites see themselves as a way for users to meet new 
people. Friendster’s “suggest a match” and “ask for an introduction” buttons 
leverage existing relationships to create new ones. Its “looking for” profile 
field is a dating-site touch that’s been adopted by many other social network 
sites: whether you check off “friendship” or “dating” on Facebook, you’re 
signaling an interest in new relationships. Other sites, like Classmates, see 
themselves as a way for friends who have fallen out of touch to reconnect.
 
92
Still, as danah boyd persuasively argues, social network sites are most 
effective at continuing relationships established offline. In her words, “[T]he 
popularity of MySpace is deeply rooted in how the site supports sociality 
amongst preexisting friend groups.”
 
93 Not only do the sites provide a new 
context for interaction, they can also help in the transmission of social cues 
that facilitate offline interactions. Friends can learn conversation-triggering 
things about each other that might have slipped through the cracks in a 
purely face-to-face age.94
If all that social network sites offered were the ability to send other users 
messages, they’d have little to recommend them over other electronic 
media, like e-mail and IM. Social network sites work for relationship 
building because they also provide semi-public, explicit ways to enact 
relationships. The act of adding someone as a contact is the most 
fundamental. It’s a socially multivalent act, which can mean everything from 
“I am your friend” to “I’m a fan of yours” to “Please let me see your contacts-
 
 
 89. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
923–24 & nn.7–8 (2005) (explaining that sharing personal information with others helps form 
friendships and citing studies indicating that the exchange of personal information promotes 
friendship). 
 90. See, e.g., TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET 127–29, 133–39 (1998) (describing 
romances and weddings carried out via telegraph). 
 91. See, e.g., JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 235–63 
(1998) (describing the author’s online romance); RHEINGOLD, supra note 70, at 20 (describing 
“heart-to-heart contact” online). 
 92. See Abby Ellin, Yoo-Hoo, First Love, Remember Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, § 9, at 16 
(explaining how social network sites “expedite the process” of tracking down old flames). 
 93. boyd, supra note 86, at 126. 
 94. See Clive Thompson, I’m So Totally, Digitally Close to You, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2008, 
§ Magazine, at 42, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07awareness-t.html 
(discussing ways that Facebook and other social technologies allow users to maintain 
connections with increasingly large groups of friends). 
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only blog.”95 Facebook resolves a bit of this ambiguity with its “Friend 
Details,” with which I can say that I know you from high school, or that we 
dated, or, amusingly, “I don’t even know this person.”96 The act of adding 
someone as a contact also (by default) gives them access to your profile 
information, a form of minor intimacy that signals trust.97
These explicit contact links then provide a foundation for more robust 
interactions.
 
98 Facebook’s Gifts are a straightforward performance of regard, 
and so are the Testimonials that Friendster’s users give each other.99 
Everything from uploaded Photos to Event invitations to Zombie bites can 
be a way to interact with people; the interaction is psychologically valued.100
It’s important to be sensitive to the social subtleties involved. Something 
as simple as a Poke can be socially rich,
 
101 whereas the only important 
message of a Wall post may be the implicit “You matter to me.”102 Some 
messages that appear to be sent to the world—like Status updates—may in 
fact be part of a conversation with specific other users.103 Friendster users 
used Testimonials to carry out extended personal conversations, even 
though Friendster also had a private-messaging feature.104
 
 95. See boyd, supra note 87 (listing thirteen reasons to add a user as a contact). On 
MySpace, things are even more free-form; having a band as a “friend” typically means only that 
you’re a fan of the band, not that you’re friends with its members. 
 Facebook’s “Wall-
to-Wall” feature, which displays the back-and-forth of Wall posts between two 
users, explicitly embeds this semi-public conversational mode in the site’s 
 96. Frances Wilson, Do You Facebook?, TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 27, 2007, § 7, at 16, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/scienceandtechnology/technology/3354649/Do-you-Facebook. 
html. 
 97. See boyd, supra note 87; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 34–37 
(2008) (discussing the intimacy theory of privacy). 
 98. Sometimes, they’re even a prerequisite; for example, non-contacts can’t leave 
comments on “friends-only” LiveJournals. See boredinsomniac, Frequently Asked Question #120: 
How Do I Make All My Journal Entries Friends-Only, Private, or Public?, LIVEJOURNAL, http://www. 
livejournal.com/support/faqbrowse.bml?faqid=120 (July 24, 2008). 
 99. See Testimonials, FRIENDSTER, http://www.friendster.com/info/testimonials.php 
(“Friendster makes me feel good because my friends write all these great testimonials about 
me.”). 
 100. See Patti M. Valkenburg et al., Friend Networking Sites and Their Relationship to Adolescents’ 
Well-Being and Social Self-Esteem, 9 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 584, 584 (2006) (finding that 
positive feedback on profiles increased users’ self-esteem), draft available at http://www2.fmg. 
uva.nl/cam/pdfs/2006_friend_networking_sites.pdf. 
 101. See Dave McClure, The Zen of Poke: A Facebook Story, MASTER OF 500 HATS, http://500 
hats.typepad.com/500blogs/2007/10/the-zen-of-poke.html (Oct. 23, 2007) (listing eighteen 
possible meanings). 
 102. See danah boyd, Socializing Digitally, VODAFONE RECEIVER MAG., June 2007, at 4, http:// 
www.danah.org/papers/VodafoneReceiver.pdf (“Friends are expected to comment as a sign of 
their affection.”). 
 103. See boyd, supra note 86, at 124 (“By [writing conversational comments on each other’s 
profiles], teens are taking social interactions between friends into the public sphere for others 
to witness.”). 
 104. See boyd & Heer, supra note 63, § 3. 
A1 - GRIMMELMANN_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:44 PM 
1156 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
interface design. The norms of social network sites encourage both 
relationships and public affirmation of them. 
These sites also piggyback on the deeply wired human impulse to 
reciprocate. People reciprocate because it helps them solve collective-action 
problems, because participation in a gift culture demands that gifts be 
returned or passed along, because it’s disrespectful to spurn social advances, 
because there’s a natural psychological instinct to mirror what one’s 
conversational partner is doing, and because we learn how to conduct 
ourselves by imitating others. Facebook’s design encourages reciprocal 
behavior by making the gesture-and-return cycle visible and salient. On your 
home page, the Status Updates box juxtaposes the question, “What’s on 
Your Mind?” with recent answers to that question from your contacts.105 
Even seemingly undirected communications—such as filling out one’s 
profile—implicitly invite conversation using the site’s tools.106
The use of real names (rather than usernames) and especially of profile 
photos humanizes the interface, giving a stronger psychological impression 
of direct interaction. As we know from dealing with panhandlers, 
telemarketers, and spammers, the more personal the appeal, the harder it is 
to ignore. Friendster intensifies this personalization by using only first names 
in contact lists and messages, which emphasizes the intimate tone. The 
combined effect of these design decisions is to make the user feel like a bad 
friend if she doesn’t sign up, write back, and expose personal information. 
After all, everyone else is doing it. 
 
It’s not a coincidence that social network sites activate relational 
impulses; they’re engineered to. Friendster holds a patent on a “Method of 
inducing content uploads in a social network”—that is, on a way to convince 
users to upload more photos of themselves and other users.107 At least four 
companies have jumped into the business of providing “analytics”—tools 
that help Application developers study how people are using their 
Applications and fine-tune them to draw more users.108 There’s even a class 
at Stanford in which students write Facebook Applications and receive 
grades based on the number of users that they attract.109
 
 105. Status, FACEBOOK, 
 
http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=706. 
 106. See boyd & Heer, supra note 63, § 1 (describing a profile as a “communicative body in 
conversation with” others). 
 107. U.S. Patent No. 7,117,254 (filed June 17, 2005). 
 108. See Justin Smith, Facebook Gives Developers More Metrics—But Who Can You Turn to For Real 
Insight?, INSIDE FACEBOOK, http://www.insidefacebook.com/2008/08/07/facebook-gives-
developers-more-metrics-but-who-can-you-turn-to-for-real-insight/ (Aug. 7, 2008) (describing 
KISSMetrics, Sometrics, Kontagent Viral Analytics, and Developer Analytics). 
 109. The Stanford Facebook Class, STANFORD PERSUASIIVE TECH. LAB, http://credibilityserver. 
stanford.edu/captology/facebook/ (Oct. 28, 2007). 
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3. Community 
The third social factor is that a social network site lets you establish your 
social position. The basic desire is simple and age-old: to be recognized as a 
valued member of one’s various communities.110
The most basic consequence of this desire is that people would enjoy 
using a social network site even if they had no reason to use it other than 
that their friends enjoy using it. If your friends are at the mall, you join them 
at the mall; if they’re on Facebook, you join them on Facebook. As danah 
boyd puts it, “When I ask teenagers why they joined MySpace, the answer is 
simple: ‘Cuz that’s where my friends are.’”
 On social network sites, 
this desire to fit in and be noticed has several important consequences. 
111 Call it a network externality,112 call 
it a coordination game,113 call it a comedy of the commons114—by whatever 
name, it means that real-life social networks rapidly tip towards mass social-
network-site adoption as overlapping groups sign up because all their friends 
are signing up: Burning Man attendees on Friendster,115 Los Angeles 
hipsters on MySpace,116 Harvard students on Facebook.117 Of course, 
signing up is pointless unless you supply enough personal information for 
your friends to find you.118
Another motivation for recreating a real-life social network on a social 
network site is to visualize it. By representing relationships as hyperlinks, the 
sites spatialize social networks, mapping the connections within them.
 
119 It 
thus becomes possible to see and to speak of an individual’s location within 
networked space, described by Julie Cohen as “a nexus of social practice by 
embodied human beings.”120
 
 110. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 274 (2000) (linking social capital, 
community membership, and sense of belonging). 
 Moving purposefully through informational 
 111. boyd, supra note 86, at 126 (emphasis added). 
 112. See OZ SHY, ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 3 (2001) (explaining that the utility 
of a network product is “affected by the number of people using similar or comparable 
products”). 
 113. See SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMICS 127–66 (2004) (giving game-theoretic 
treatment of situations in which players are better off if they take similar actions). 
 114. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (describing social situations in which a “the more the 
merrier” dynamic prevails). 
 115. See boyd, supra note 87. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Phillips, supra note 20. 
 118. See boyd, supra note 86, at 127–30 (discussing profile creation and identity 
management on MySpace). 
 119. See generally DAVID GELERNTNER, MIRROR WORLDS 22–36 (1991) (describing the 
importance of navigable information spaces that “mirror” offline phenomena). 
 120. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 236 (2007). 
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space can be pleasurable in itself;121
This navigational pleasure also provides an inducement to extend your 
social horizon. Because many privacy settings are based on network distance, 
the more contacts you have, the more profiles are visible to you. If you add 
Seth as a contact, all of his contacts are now contacts-of-contacts of yours—
and all of your contacts are now contacts-of-contacts of his. Adding 
connections fills out your social map, giving you a richer view of your social 
context.
 the traversal function of a social 
network site offers the experience of navigating your own social geography. 
122 It also makes you yourself more valuable as a contact, since by 
connecting to you, others can expand their own horizons.123
Moreover, social network sites enable users to negotiate a different kind 
of social “position”: their status within communities. By reifying relationships 
and making them visible, social network sites enable new forms of 
competitive, conspicuous accumulation.
 Connectedness 
is social currency. 
124 People compete, for example, to 
add more contacts. There’s an entire niche of programs that will add more 
MySpace contacts for you.125 A stand-up comedian racked up 182,000 
Facebook contacts in 2005.126 Facebook later instituted a 5000-contact limit, 
which led bloggers to protest angrily when they bumped up against it.127 
And it’s not just contact counts: any number, badge, or ranking will be 
treated as a competitive game by someone.128
 
 121. See JANET H. MURRAY, HAMLET ON THE HOLODECK 129–30 (1997). 
 Indeed, plenty of Facebook 
Applications are competitive games; it’s no coincidence that Scrabulous, 
Zombies, and other games prominently display each user’s scores. My 
personal favorite for blatant commodification of community is the “Friends 
 122. See boyd, supra note 14, at 2. 
 123. See BARABÁSI, supra note 7, at 55–64 (describing the value of “hubs,” i.e., highly 
connected nodes). 
 124. See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2007) (1899). 
 125. See, e.g., ADDERDEMON, http://www.adderdemon.com/; ADDMYFRIENDS, http://www. 
addmyfriends.com/; FRIENDBLASTERPRO, http://www.addnewfriends.com/. 
 126. See Anne Wootton, Quest for Facebook Friends Turns into $10K Hurricane Relief Effort, 
BROWN DAILY HERALD (Providence), Sept. 9, 2005, http://media.www.browndailyherald.com/ 
media/storage/paper472/news/2005/09/09/CampusWatch/Quest.For.Facebook.Friends.Tur
ns.Into.10k.Hurricane.Relief.Effort-980480.shtml. 
 127. See, e.g., Robert Scoble, The You-Don’t-Need-More-Friends Lobby, SCOBLEIZER, http:// 
scobleizer.com/2007/10/14/the-you-dont-need-more-friends-lobby/ (Oct. 14, 2007) 
(protesting angrily). 
 128. See Reputation, YAHOO! DEVELOPER NETWORK DESIGN PATTERN LIBRARY, http:// 
developer.yahoo.com/ypatterns/parent.php?pattern=reputation (describing the use of patterns 
like “Leaderboard” and “Collectible Achievements” to harness the user community’s 
competitive desires for good). 
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for Sale” Application, which has over 2,300,000 users putting price tags on 
each other.129
Similarly, the constant human desire to be part of desirable social 
groups drives social-network-site adoption and use. One study of college 
students found “a robust connection between Facebook usage and 
indicators of social capital, especially of the bridging type.”
 
130 In addition to 
the direct value of the friendships themselves, you can signal your coolness 
by having cool friends.131 Of course, in a familiar pattern, this signal itself 
becomes devalued if given off too obviously.132 Some users call anyone else 
who they think has too many contacts a “slut” or a “whore.”133 Many of these 
dynamics are driven by the explicit representations of status demanded by 
the use of a software platform.134 MySpace had a “Top 8” feature; only the 
other users on one’s Top Friends list would appear on one’s profile. danah 
boyd has documented the “tremendous politics” this feature generated, “not 
unlike the drama over best and bestest friends in middle school.”135 These 
“active[] signal[s]” of intimacy and respect use publicly revealed personal 
information to “work[] through status issues.”136
* * * 
 
Identity, relationship, and community are not unique to social network 
sites. They’re basic elements of social interaction, offline and on. This urge 
to sociality is a highly motivating force—only sustenance and safety come 
before it on the Maslow hierarchy of human needs.137
As this Section has shown, however, these social urges can’t be satisfied 
under conditions of complete secrecy. Identity performance requires an 
audience; relationships are impossible without others; community is a 
 It’s always been 
central to the human experience, and it always will be. 
 
 129. Friends for Sale!, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/apps/application.php?api_key= 
ac434b27ff9de7e3ae41944571c91e34. 
 130. Nicole Ellison et al., The Benefits of Facebook “Friends”: Social Capital and College Students’ 
Use of Online Social Network Sites, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 12(4), art. 1 (2007), http:// 
jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue4/ellison.html. 
 131. See boyd, supra note 87 (giving, as reason number seven to add a contact, “[t]heir 
Profile is cool so being Friends makes you look cool”). 
 132. See Stephanie Tom Tong et al., Too Much of a Good Thing? The Relationship Between 
Number of Friends and Interpersonal Impressions on Facebook, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 531, 
542 (finding that viewers’ ratings of a Facebook user’s social attractiveness declined as the 
number of friends listed on the profile increased beyond 300). 
 133. boyd, supra note 87; boyd, supra note 80, at 22. 
 134. See James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1740 (2005) 
(explaining that software necessarily applies “explicit ex ante rule[s]”). 
 135. boyd, supra note 87. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 372–86 (1943) 
(listing and discussing the basic human needs in order of importance). 
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public.138
B. RISK EVALUATION 
 These factors intertwine; my comment on your Wall is a statement 
about who I am, an affirmation of our relationship, and a claim to a social 
position in proximity to you, all at once. Given how deeply these urges run, 
is it any wonder that social-network-site users are sometimes willing to give 
up a little privacy in exchange? 
The social dynamics of social network sites do more than just give 
people a reason to use them notwithstanding the privacy risks. They also 
cause people to misunderstand those risks. People rely heavily on informal 
signals to help them envision their audience and their relationship to it. 
Facebook systematically delivers signals suggesting an intimate, confidential, 
and safe setting. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these signals are the same ones that 
make it such a natural place for socializing. 
People don’t think about privacy risks in the way that perfectly rational 
automata would. Instead, real people use all sorts of simplifying heuristics 
when they think about risk, some psychological (people fear the 
unfamiliar),139 some social (people fear what their friends fear),140 and 
some cultural (people fear things that threaten their shared worldviews).141 
As one recent review asserts, “culture is cognitively prior to facts” in risk 
evaluation.142
When these risks are privacy risks, and when that evaluation takes place 
in the context of a social network site, these observations have particular 
force.
 What people “know” about how the world works drives their 
perception of risks. 
143 For one thing, there is absolutely no plausible way to assign 
probabilities to many of the possible outcomes. With sufficient data, we 
could in theory make reasoned decisions about the statistical trustworthiness 
of large commercial entities.144
 
 138. See boyd, supra note 86, at 124–26 (describing social interactions among teens carried 
out in front of “networked publics”). 
 We can’t reason in that way about the 
 139. See CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 35–63 (2005). 
 140. See id. at 89–106. 
 141. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE 
SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982). 
 142. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083 (2006). 
 143. See Lilian Edwards & Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networking: Irreconcilable Ideas?, 
in HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW, AND THE CORPORATION 19 (Andrea 
Matwyshyn ed., forthcoming 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1148732 (“It is in human nature to want jam today—fun and frivolity—over jam tomorrow – 
safety and security in some murky future where relationships, job opportunities and promotions 
may be pursued.”). 
 144. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Measuring Identity Theft (Version 2.0) (June 26, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1152082 (reporting comparative data on identity-theft-related fraud rates at financial 
institutions). 
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complex, situated, emotional–social dynamics of our contact networks. What 
is the probability that one of my contacts will republish some of my Wall 
posts on the Internet?145
The water’s fine; come on in. Most of the time, when in doubt, we do what 
everyone else is doing.
 The best we can do is rely—and mostly 
subconsciously—on the proxies for privacy risks that seem to work well in 
the social settings that we’re familiar with. These proxies don’t always work 
so well on Facebook. 
146 Quantitatively, fifty million Facebook users can’t 
be wrong;147 qualitatively, it must be that your Facebook-trusting friends 
know something you don’t.148 The problem with this heuristic is that it 
falsely assumes that other users know something about how safe Facebook is. 
Mass adoption is an echo chamber, not a careful pooling of information.149
Safety in numbers. When we’re nervous, we stick with the crowd because it 
feels safer than being exposed on our own.
 
When our friends all jump off the Facebook privacy bridge, we do too. 
Those behind us figure we wouldn’t have jumped unless it was safe, and the 
cycle repeats. 
150 They won’t single me out; they 
can’t possibly shoot all of us. On a social network site with over a hundred 
million users, what are the odds that the New York Times will write a front-
page story about your personal indiscretions? Not high. This kind of 
reasoning, while perhaps valid for mobs151 and financial instruments,152
 
 145. See, e.g., Dan Gurewitch, Epic Burn, COLLEGEHUMOR, http://www.collegehumor.com/ 
article:1759531 (July 24, 2008). The victim here was lucky; the re-poster blanked out his full 
name. Id. 
 
doesn’t work for thinking about social-network-site privacy. Some kinds of 
 146. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 114–66 (1993) 
(explaining why it is sometimes, but not always, reasonable to go with the crowd and why most 
people usually do). 
 147. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xi–xxi (2004) (summarizing 
arguments for the collective intelligence of large groups). 
 148. If your friends are concerned with privacy and you trust their judgment, Bayesian 
reasoning says that each time you observe one of them choosing to join a site, you should revise 
upwards your estimate of the probability that the site is in fact safe. See generally STUART J. 
RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 426–29 (1995) 
(explaining Bayes’ Theorem, which provides a mathematical rule for updating probability 
estimates in light of new knowledge). 
 149. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as 
Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 994 (1992). 
 150. Sometimes it is. See W.D. Hamilton, Geometry for the Selfish Herd, 31 J. THEORETICAL 
BIOLOGY 295, 295–311 (1971) (showing how herding behavior can result from self-interested 
decisions of animals fleeing a predator). 
 151. See, e.g., W.A. Westley, The Nature and Control of Hostile Crowds, 23 CANADIAN J. ECON. & 
POL. SCI. 33, 38 (1957) (describing the police tactic of “pretend[ing] to know people in the 
crowd” to destroy crowd members’ sense of anonymity and thus to restore order). 
 152. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial 
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1632–71 (2008) (assessing the process by which 
commonly used financial devices become “too big to fail”). 
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privacy problems, such as the arrival of News Feeds, hit everyone on 
Facebook at once, whereas most individual risks (e.g., a stalker) don’t 
depend on the overall size of the site.153
I think we’re alone now. We don’t say private things when the wrong 
people are listening in.
 
154 To know whether they might be, we rely on 
social155 and architectural156 heuristics to help us envision our potential 
audience.157 Facebook’s design sends mutually reinforcing signals that it’s a 
private space, closed to unwanted outsiders. Seeing contacts’ pictures and 
names makes it easy to visualize talking to them; unlike in a restaurant, 
potential eavesdroppers are literally invisible.158
Nobody in here but us chickens. People tend to assume (incorrectly) that a 
whole social network site is populated by people like them;
 
159 it’s easy for 
college students to think that only college students use Facebook. This 
insularity also inhibits users’ ability to remember that not everyone using the 
site shares their privacy norms.160
You know me, old buddy, old pal. We don’t say private things to people we 
don’t know. Facebook is great at making us feel like we know lots of people. 
You see where this is going. The pictures, names, and other informal 
touches make each contact look like a well-known friend. That’s socially 
satisfying, but primate brains only seem capable of maintaining between one 
 The availability of technical controls (and 
the language of “control” in Facebook’s policies and PR statements) further 
invites users to think in terms of boundedness, even though the actual 
network boundaries are highly porous. The powerful, if unspoken, message 
is that what you say on Facebook will reach your contacts and desired 
contacts but no one else. 
 
 153. To be fair, since privacy norms depend on mass adoption, if everyone makes 
embarrassing revelations on Facebook, it may contribute to norms of forgiveness. The question 
of whether we’re undergoing a great generational shift in privacy norms—and if so, to what—is 
a large and important question that I cannot possibly do justice to here. 
 154. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 508–12 
(2007) (describing how courts in Fourth Amendment cases sometimes seek to understand 
societal expectations of observation). 
 155. See Strahilevitz, supra note 89, at 925–27 (discussing how social norms protect 
disclosures to good friends while anonymity protects disclosures to strangers). 
 156. See Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 13–15 (2004). 
 157. See boyd, supra note 86, at 127–34. 
 158. See DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 14–15 (1999) (“An added factor that helps 
deter people from staring [in a restaurant] is not wanting to be caught in the act.”). 
 159. See boyd, supra note 87; Seth Kugel, Google’s Orkut Captivates Brazilians, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Apr. 10, 2006, § Finance, at 9, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/09/business/ 
orkut.php (“Almost as soon as Brazilians started taking over Orkut in 2004 . . . English-speaking 
users formed virulently anti-Brazilian communities like ‘Too Many Brazilians on Orkut.’”). 
 160. See, e.g., Gabriel Sherman, Testing Horace Mann, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 30, 2007, http:// 
nymag.com/news/features/45592/ (describing the argument over the propriety of a high-
school teacher looking at student Facebook groups). 
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and two hundred close relationships at a time.161
I know how much this means to you. When we say things to people in 
person, we also tell them our expectations about how much to keep what we 
say private. We’re rarely explicit about it; that’s what leaning in, speaking 
quietly, and touching them on the arm are for. Electronic media are 
notorious for their ability to garble these nonverbal signals.
 Everyone else isn’t a close 
friend, and the socially thick sense of mutual personal obligation that keeps 
confidences confidential doesn’t always operate as strongly as we expect. 
162 Especially in 
young media—such as Facebook—without well-established norms, people 
may disagree about expectations, leading to misunderstandings about 
confidentiality.163
Cut it out! Do you think I can’t see what you’re doing? When we trust people, 
it’s often because of mutual surveillance;
 
164 we’ll see if they betray us, and 
they know it, and we know that they know, and so on. This cooperative 
equilibrium breaks down easily in electronic media; people exit online 
communities all the time with spectacular betrayals and recriminations all 
around.165 The same reasons there’s a mismatch between our own actions 
on Facebook and our (insufficient) perceptions of being watched also mean 
there’s a mismatch between others’ actions and their (insufficient) 
perceptions of being watched.166 And finally, the surveillance that most 
social network sites permit is better for learning personal information than it 
is for detecting misuse of that information.167
 
 161. See R.I.M. Dunbar, Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates, 22 J. HUM. 
EVOLUTION 469–93 (1992); Carl Bialik, Sorry, You May Have Gone Over Your Limit of Network 
Friends, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2007, 
 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119518271549595364.html. 
 162. WALLACE, supra note 73, at 14–19 (describing emoticons as a compensation for the 
difficulty of conveying tone online). 
 163. See James Grimmelmann, Accidental Privacy Spills, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 5 (2008) (noting 
that once confidential information is introduced to online media such as e-mail, it can “spread 
like wildfire”). 
 164. Compare BRIN, supra note 158, at 254–57 (promoting “mutually assured surveillance”), 
with Mark Andrejevic, The Work of Watching One Another: Lateral Surveillance, Risk, and Governance, 
2 SURVEILLANCE & SOC. 479, 494 (2005) (“In an era in which everyone is to be considered 
potentially suspect, we are invited to become spies—for our own good.”). 
 165. See, e.g., KATIE HAFNER, THE WELL 85–101 (2001) (describing one member’s 
destructive exit from an online community); cf. Luís Cabral & Ali Hortaçsu, The Dynamics of 
Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay 24–31 (N.Y.U., Stern Sch. of Bus., Working Paper EC-06-32, 
2006), http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26094 (documenting “opportunistic exit” by eBay 
sellers). 
 166. For a nice discussion of how people’s behavior changes when they think that someone 
might be watching them, read the comments to Hamilton Nolan, Who’s Stalking You on Facebook, 
GAWKER (May 13, 2008), http://gawker.com/390004/whos-stalking-you-on-facebook 
(describing a Facebook “feature” that supposedly provided a “list of the five people who search 
for your name most often”). The mere thought that searches might be visible to others makes 
some people freak out. 
 167. The previous example will serve just as well. Facebook immediately disabled the 
feature and claimed that it had nothing to do with who was searching for you. See Caroline 
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* * * 
These misleading heuristics are all fueled by the relentless use of others’ 
personal information. The more common self-revelation becomes on 
Facebook, the safer it feels—even when it isn’t. If I upload a profile photo, 
that photo becomes a signal to you to trust me. The more personal your 
interactions with a few close friends, the less salient the presence of outsiders 
becomes. This is where the viral nature of Facebook participation is clearest 
and most frightening. By joining Facebook and adding you as a contact, I 
convince you to let down your guard. Once I’ve infected you, you’ll help do 
the same for others. 
None of this would happen if Facebook were not catalyzing genuine 
social interaction. Facebook very quickly gives a strong sense of relationship 
with other users; that sense is both a satisfying reason to use Facebook and a 
highly misleading heuristic for evaluating the privacy risks. Tipping 
dynamics mean that everyone cool is on Facebook; they also make us believe 
that everyone cool thinks Facebook is privacy-safe. And so on. Plenty of fake 
things happen on Facebook, but the social interaction is real. 
C. HARMS 
So far, we’ve seen that people’s reasons for using social network sites 
and their evaluation of the privacy risks involved are driven by social factors. 
This Section will describe the similarly social dynamics of six common 
patterns of privacy violations on social network sites: disclosure, surveillance, 
instability, disagreement, spillovers, and denigration. 
All six patterns are united by a common theme: their “peer-to-peer” 
nature. Users’ privacy is harmed when other users learn sensitive personal 
information about them. Facebook enters the picture as a catalyst; it enables 
privacy violations more often than it perpetrates them. Because the patterns 
interlock and interrelate, this Section is not offered as a precise taxonomy of 
social-network-site privacy harms. Daniel Solove has already created a 
perfectly good taxonomy of privacy interests in general, so I’ll simply refer to 
his categories as appropriate.168
1. Disclosure 
 
One night in the summer of 2006, after a night out drinking, Marc 
Chiles, a student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, was 
urinating in a bush when a police officer spotted him.169
 
McCarthy, Facebook Pulls ‘Stalker List’ Tool After Gawker Exposes It, WEBWARE, May 13, 2008, 
 Chiles ran away, so 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-9943285-2.html. That restored the status quo in which 
you could search for other people—thereby gathering information on them—but not learn 
whether anyone was gathering and distributing information on you and your contacts. 
 168. See SOLOVE, supra note 97, at 101–70; Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 477, 480 (2006). 
 169. See Jodi S. Cohen, Cop Snares College Pals in Own Web, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 2006, at C1. 
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the officer questioned another student, Adam Gartner, who was also present 
at the scene.170 Gartner denied knowing the mystery urinator, but the 
officer logged on to Facebook, where he discovered that Chiles and Gartner 
were listed as friends.171 The officer ticketed both of them.172
Gartner and Chiles may be more frat-boy than poster-boy, and we may 
be glad that they incriminated themselves on Facebook, but theirs is still a 
case about privacy. Specifically, they were victims of what Daniel Solove calls 
disclosure: a fact they’d rather have kept under wraps became more widely 
known.
 
173
The best-known examples of unwanted disclosure on social network 
sites involve students acting their age and being called out for it by authority 
figures. One college student lost a shot at a summer internship when the 
company’s president saw that his Facebook profile listed “smokin’ blunts” as 
an interest.
 Unwanted disclosure is everywhere on social network sites. 
174 Disclosure is hardly limited to students, though. Someone 
blackmailed Miss New Jersey 2007 by sending racy pictures from a private 
Facebook album to pageant officials.175 Or consider Sandra Soroka, who 
posted a Facebook status update saying that she was “letting Will know it’s 
officially over via Facebook status,” only to see the story flood the 
Internet.176
While people using any social medium often start with the implicit 
assumption that they’re addressing only a peer group, social network sites 
add two things. First, there’s a tighter psychic focus on “speaking” to your 
 These people all thought (if only subconsciously) that their 
Facebook activities would be seen only by a trusted few; they were all wrong. 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See SOLOVE, supra note 97, at 140–46. Chiles was lucky that Gartner didn’t upload and 
tag a photo of him actually doing the deed, as other college students have. See Jim Saksa, 
Facebook—The Fall of Privacy, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Philadelphia), Mar. 31, 2008, http:// 
media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2008/03/31/Opinion/Ji
m-Saksa.Facebook.The.Fall.Of.Privacy-3292188.shtml (“On Facebook you can find pictures of 
me in a girl’s shirt, urinating in public and drinking in a variety of settings.”). That would have 
crossed the line into what Solove calls exposure: “exposing to others certain emotional and 
physical attributes about a person . . . that people view as deeply primordial.” SOLOVE, supra 
note 97, at 146–49. 
 174. Alan Finder, When a Risque Online Persona Undermines a Chance for a Job, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 2006, § 1, at 1. 
 175. See Austin Fenner, N.J. Miss in a Fix over Her Pics, N.Y. POST, July 5, 2007, at 5, http:// 
www.nypost.com/seven/07062007/news/regionalnews/n_j__miss_in_a_fix_over_her_pics_regi
onalnews_austin_fenner__with_post_wire_services.htm (“A mysterious blackmailer has 
threatened to make public a series of personal web photographs of Miss New Jersey [from her 
Facebook page] . . . unless she surrenders the crown.”) 
 176. See Jenna Wortham, Is the Infamous Facebook Breakup Actually a Hoax?, UNDERWIRE, 
http://blog.wired.com/underwire/2007/12/is-the-infamous.html (Dec. 6, 2007). 
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preexisting social network.177 Second, there’s a clearer expectation of 
boundedness; not everyone is “supposed” to be on the site.178 Facebook’s 
rules about who can and can’t join, however, are leaky. Sometimes, people 
lie when they sign up for social-network-site accounts.179 Sometimes, they 
don’t need to. College faculty and administrators already have email 
addresses giving them access to their schools’ Networks. Typically, so do 
alumni, which means that potential employers can ask alums to check on 
current students for them.180
College students have used privacy rhetoric to express their anger about 
disclosure on Facebook.
 
181
2. Surveillance 
 Their senses of identity and community are at 
stake. Their elders see them in ways they’d rather not be seen, which is a 
dignitary insult to their desired identity. Furthermore, their elders see them 
that way by sneaking onto Facebook, which disrupts the integrity of their 
chosen social groups. 
There’s also a privacy issue with Facebook investigations even if the 
investigator doesn’t learn much. Solove calls this privacy harm surveillance: 
“awareness that one is being watched.”182 He connects it to “anxiety and 
discomfort . . . self-censorship and inhibition,” even “social control.”183
 
 177. As Lauren Gelman observes, many blog authors choose publicly accessible media “with 
the thought that someone they cannot identify a priori might find the information interesting 
or useful.” (unpublished draft on file with author). 
 In 
my framework, surveillance implicates the relationship interest; the spy has 
an asymmetrical, violative relationship with her subject. In the student 
examples, students believe that searches on Facebook break the rules of the 
student–administrator or student–employer relationship. Even Adam 
Gartner, whose lie to the police was exposed on Facebook, saw a relational 
surveillance problem. “I got bone-crushed,” he said; “[i]t’s a pretty shady way 
 178. See Sherman, supra note 160 (summarizing student sentiment as, “[W]hy should 
students be disciplined for posting to sites that weren’t intended to be public?”). 
 179. See, e.g., Indictment at 7–8, United States v. Drew, No. CR-08-582-GW-001 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 2008), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/my_space_lori_drew_indictment.pdf. The 
indictment claims that the defendant created a false MySpace profile in violation of the site’s 
terms of service and that doing so constituted a violation of the federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). This theory is legally questionable. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The 
MySpace Suicide Indictment—And Why It Should Be Dismissed, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1210889188.shtml (May 15, 2008) (questioning the legal basis for 
indictment). 
 180. See, e.g., Andrew Grossman, Is This How You Want Your Employer to See You for the First 
Time?, MICH. DAILY (Ann Arbor), Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/how-
you-want-your-employer-see-you-first-time. 
 181. Id. (calling employer use of Facebook “unethical”). 
 182. SOLOVE, supra note 97, at 106–12. Note that surveillance in this sense, while a direct 
privacy harm, does lead users to be more cautious, which can have indirect privacy benefits. 
 183. Id. at 108. 
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they got us.”184 Chiles agreed, saying “It seems kind of unfair.”185 They’ve 
got a mental template for the student–police relationship, one with ethical 
limits; for a police officer to use Facebook in an investigation transgresses 
those limits. Of course, it isn’t just college administrators conducting 
surveillance on Facebook, it’s also police, lawyers,186 and private 
investigators.187
One-sidedness seems to be a recurring theme of surveillance issues 
among users. Consider the following paraphrase of a self-confessed 
“Facebook stalker’s”
 
188
With close friends, it is always OK to comment on their profiles; 
they expect it and might even be upset if you don’t. With distant 
acquaintances, it is almost never OK. It’s those in the middle that 
are tricky; it’s OK to bring up their profiles only if there is a 
reasonable explanation for why you were looking at it in the first 
place.
 code of ethics: 
189
Note the social norms coded in these guidelines. The profiles 
themselves are widely visible. It’s fine—indeed intended—for “close friends” 
to look at one’s profile. It’s also fine for more distant acquaintances to look 
at your profile, but there needs to be a social reason. People with no social 
connection to you could look at your profile but shouldn’t; it’s not your 
responsibility to fence them out. 
 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Vesna Jaksic, Finding Treasures for Cases on Facebook, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 15, 2007, http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=900005493439. 
 187. See Kevin D. Bousquet, Facebook.com Vs Your Privacy—By a Private Investigator, PRIVATE 
INVESTIGATION CTR., http://corpainvestigation.wordpress.com/2007/04/25/facebookcom-vs-
your-privacy-by-a-private-investigator/ (Apr. 25, 2007). 
 188. “Stalking” means more than just looking at someone’s Facebook profile. It’s also an 
obsessive pattern of observing someone else, a pattern that can culminate in violence. Stalking 
moved online early, see generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ 
cyberstalking.htm, and many states now criminalize stalking with statutes specifically targeting 
online activities, see Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 149 (2007). The appropriation of the term 
to describe certain uses of social network sites is a reminder of the high stakes. There are 
people with Facebook stalkers that they don’t know about, some of whom will become criminal 
stalkers. I would add that older forms of stalking harassment are also migrating to social 
network sites. See, e.g., People v. Fernino, 851 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Crim. Ct. 2008) (finding that a 
MySpace friend request could constitute a “contact” in violation of a protective order); Laura 
Clout, Man Jailed over Facebook Message, TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 5, 2007, http://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1565048/Man-jailed-over-Facebook-message.html (describing a 
similar case on Facebook). 
 189. Byron Dubow, Confessions of ‘Facebook Stalkers,’ USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2007, http://www. 
usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2007-03-07-facebook-stalking_N.htm. 
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Lauren Gelman describes this phenomenon in terms of “blurry-edged 
social networks”; your profile might be of legitimate social interest to many 
people, but you’re not sure in advance exactly who. By making it broadly 
viewable, you can reach out to all of them; the social norm against snooping 
puts implicit limits on how far the information should spread.190 But since 
snooping is generally invisible, that’s an easy norm to violate.191
This observation explains the trend of the reactions to the News Feed 
rollout. I suspect that most Facebook users would have opted in to sharing 
with News Feed for the same reasons that they opted in to Facebook itself. 
But when News Feed launched, users were made vividly aware that they 
could now monitor each other, invisibly and in real time. Further, News 
Feed made it obviously trivial to assemble a rich portrait of a user by 
combining many individual data points. The Chicago Tribune’s HeadCandy 
blog made this point with a graphic that told the story of a relationship with 
nothing but News Feed entries, from “Kevin and Jennifer are in a 
relationship” through “Amy friended Kevin” and “Jennifer wrote on Amy’s 
Wall: ‘You tramp’” all the way to “Kevin is now listed as ‘single.’”
 Thus, it may 
be that the real faux pas isn’t looking at someone’s Facebook page, but 
letting them know that you did. 
192
Thus, Facebook took an activity considered creepy—stalking—and 
made it psychologically salient for its users. There was no change in the 
actual accessibility of information, just a shift that focused users’ attention 
on the panoptic prospect of constant, undetectable surveillance.
 
193 The 
immediate uproar was unsurprising, as danah boyd has explained.194
3. Instability 
 
However, as time passed, things settled into the same equilibrium as before. 
Precisely because the surveillance is invisible, you don’t need to think about 
it, and the distinctive privacy harm of surveillance (as opposed to disclosure) 
recedes. 
One of the most disruptive things that a social network site can do is to 
change the ground rules of how personal information flows—and social 
 
 190. Gelman, supra note 177. 
 191. Cf., e.g., Nara Schoenberg, Don’t Go into Date Blind; Singles Google Before Canoodling, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 2, 2001, Tempo, at 3 (describing the practice of using Google to research potential 
romantic partners). 
 192. Jonathon Berlin, A Modern Day Romance (Using Facebook’s News Feed Feature as a Narrative 
Device), HEADCANDY, http://featuresblogs.chicagotribune.com/headcandy/2008/06/a-modern-
day-ro.html (June 25, 2008); cf. Sarah Schmelling, Hamlet (Facebook News Feed Edition), 
MCSWEENEY’S, July 30, 2008, http://mcsweeneys.net/2008/7/30schmelling.html (retelling 
Hamlet in the form of News Feed updates). 
 193. This surveillance is not panoptic in the Foucaldian sense; it doesn’t enforce discipline 
through internalization. It’s panoptic in the more limited, more literal Benthamite sense; you 
never know whether you’re being watched or not. 
 194. boyd, supra note 35. 
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network sites do it a lot. Friendster and Facebook originally kept profiles 
wholly internal. Now both sites put “limited profiles” on the public Internet, 
where search engines can find them.195 There are opt-outs, but the opt-outs 
don’t address the more fundamental problem: these limited profiles went 
live after people had uploaded personal information to sites that weren’t on 
the publicly searchable Web.196
In Solove’s taxonomy, this is a problem of secondary use: “the use of data 
for purposes unrelated to the purposes for which the data was originally 
collected without the data subject’s consent.”
 If you—like most people—formed your 
privacy expectations around the way the site originally worked, they ceased 
being valid when the site changed. 
197 Helen Nissenbaum’s theory 
of privacy as contextual integrity also pinpoints the problem: once a site has 
established a social “context” with specific informational “norms of flow,” it 
transgresses those norms by changing the structure of informational flow.198 
Nissenbaum’s theory provides an alternate explanation of the privacy 
problem with News Feed. The information wasn’t exposed to the wrong 
people, wasn’t particularly sensitive, and wasn’t sent to a more public 
place.199
Social network sites disrupt flow norms in privacy-damaging ways all the 
time. Friendster launched a “Who’s viewed me?” feature in 2005; with it, 
users could find out which other users had looked at their profiles.
 Instead, Facebook changed how profile-update information flowed 
from users to their contacts. Pull (you visit my profile to check on me) and 
push (my activities are sent to you automatically) are socially different, so 
switching between them implicates privacy values. 
200 We’ve 
seen that the inability to know who’s watching you on a social network site 
can lead to a mistaken sense of privacy, so it’s possible to defend “Who’s 
viewed me?” as a privacy-promoting step.201
 
 195. See Frequently Asked Questions: What Is My Public (Limited) Profile?, FRIENDSTER (Jan. 11, 
2007), http://friendster.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/friendster.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_ 
faqid=192 (discussing the information included in a public profile); Search, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.new.facebook.com/help.php?page=428. 
 Perhaps it is, once we reach 
 196. See danah boyd, Facebook’s “Opt-Out” Precedent, APOPHENIA, http://www.zephoria.org/ 
thoughts/archives/2007/12/11/facebooks_optou.html (Dec. 11, 2007). 
 197. SOLOVE, supra note 97, at 129–33. 
 198. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 136–38 (2004). 
 199. See id. at 133–36 (rejecting the principles of government action, sensitivity, and 
location as insufficient to describe privacy violations). 
 200. Tara Wheatland, Friendster’s Sneak Attack on Your Anonymity, BIPLOG (Sept. 29, 2005), 
http://www.boalt.org/biplog/archive/000631.html. The feature can be disabled; a user willing 
to give up the ability to see who’s viewed his or her page can view other pages anonymously. 
Frequently Asked Questions: Who’s Viewed Me?, FRIENDSTER (Feb. 15, 2007), http://friendster. 
custhelp.com/cgi-bin/friendster.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=212. As Wheatland 
notes, however, Friendster deployed the feature without announcement, and opting out didn’t 
retroactively efface users’ nose prints. Wheatland, supra. 
 201. See Lior Strahilevitz, Friendster and Symmetrical Privacy, UNIV. CHI. LAW SCH. FACULTY 
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2005), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2005/10/friendster_and_.html. 
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equilibrium, but the unpleasant privacy surprises involved in the transition 
are themselves a serious problem.202
Facebook’s Beacon provides another good example of a contextual 
integrity violation, this time involving an information flow into a social 
network site. E-commerce shoppers don’t expect their purchase information 
to be dispersed to third parties.
 They disrupt established relationships 
and redefine the scope of relevant communities out from under users’ feet. 
203 They especially don’t expect it to be 
imported into social network sites. Pushing purchase data into Facebook 
thus transgressed the flow norms of two different contexts. Beacon also 
interfered with certain socially sanctioned forms of secret-keeping: one 
blogger complained that Facebook ruined his son’s birthday by spoiling the 
surprise when it pushed a video-game purchase out into his Facebook feed 
where his son could see it.204
Finally, it’s worth noting that there are both unintentional instability 
problems—i.e., bugs—and malicious ones—i.e., security breaches. Facebook 
has had to scramble to fix privacy leaks caused by mistakes in how it handled 
searches
 
205 and in how it keeps photos private,206
 
See generally BRIN, supra note 159. While the principle of “symmetrical privacy” or “mutually 
assured surveillance” may work in other settings, the “Who’s viewed me?” feature probably 
doesn’t actually implement it. Not only does the opt-out mean that anyone willing to give up 
one kind of surveillance (knowing who’s viewed their profile) can engage in another (viewing 
others’ profiles anonymously), users can circumvent even this modest restriction. I have an 
alternate account on Friendster in addition to my named account. See Ben, FRIENDSTER, 
 and it banned the “Secret 
http://profiles.friendster.com/1327678 (showing me with a paper bag over my head). If I leave 
my main account in the “Who’s viewed me?” system but opt-out with my alternate account, then 
whenever I want to browse profiles anonymously, I can do so through my alternate account. 
Meanwhile, my main account can track anyone who’s viewing it. 
 202. See Wheatland, supra note 201 (“This freaks me out.”). 
 203. See JOSEPH TUROW, ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PA., AMERICANS AND 
ONLINE PRIVACY: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN 3–4 (2003), http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/ 
internet-privacy-report/36-page-turow-version-9.pdf [hereinafter TUROW, AMERICANS AND 
ONLINE PRIVACY]; JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PA., 
OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICA’S SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE (2005), http://repository. 
upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc_papers [hereinafter TUROW ET AL., 
OPEN TO EXPLOITATION]. Perhaps online shoppers ought to expect their purchase information 
to be dispersed, given how widely purchase information is shared, online and off. But they 
don’t. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, Research Report: What Californians 
Understand About Privacy Offline (May 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133075 (finding that large fractions of Californians 
overestimated the legal limits on data sharing by merchants. 
 204. Mike Monteiro, Facebook, You Owe Me One Christmas Present, OFF HOOF (Nov. 20, 2007), 
http://weblog.muledesign.com/2007/11/facebook_you_owe_me_one_christ.php. 
 205. See Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Information Revelation and Privacy in Online 
Social Networks (The Facebook Case) § 3.5, at 7 (2005) (unpublished manuscript), http:// 
www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/privacy-facebook-gross-acquisti.pdf; Ryan Singel, Private 
Facebook Pages Are Not So Private, WIRED (Oct. 9, 2007) http://www.wired.com/print/software/ 
webservices/news/2007/06/facebookprivacysearch (describing Facebook’s move to close a 
hole that leaked identities of users “who thought they marked their information as private, but 
didn’t also change their search settings”). 
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Crush” Application after security researchers discovered that it tricked users 
into downloading and installing adware on their computers.207 Samy 
Kamkar took advantage of MySpace’s profile customization options to write 
a computer worm that spread from page to page, adding the phrase “but 
most of all, Samy is my hero.”208 It infected over a million MySpace pages.209 
These may sound like garden-variety computer-security issues, but they’re 
also fueled by social-network-site dynamics. The Samy worm, for example, 
took advantage of MySpace’s identity-promoting profile customization and 
spread so rapidly because MySpace users formed a highly connected social 
network.210
4. Disagreement 
 
The New York Times recently ran an article on the phenomenon of 
“untagging” on Facebook: 
De-tagging—removing your name from a Facebook photo—has 
become an image-saving step in the college party cycle. “The event 
happens, pictures are up within 12 hours, and within another 12 
hours people are de-tagging,” says Chris Pund, a senior at Radford 
University in Virginia. . . . “If I’m holding something I shouldn’t be 
holding, I’ll untag,” says Robyn Backer, a junior at Virginia 
Wesleyan College. She recalls how her high school principal saw 
online photos of partying students and suspended the athletes who 
were holding beer bottles but not those with red plastic cups. “And 
if I’m making a particularly ugly face, I’ll untag myself. Anything 
really embarrassing, I’ll untag.”211
The remarkable thing about the untagging ritual is that it would be 
completely unnecessary if there weren’t a corresponding tagging ritual. 
Robyn Backer doesn’t want a photo of her holding a beer bottle tagged with 
her name on Facebook, but the friend who tagged it does.
 
212
 
 206. Michael Liedtke, Security Lapse Exposes Facebook Photos, MSNBC, Mar. 24, 2008, 
 Backer’s friend 
http:// 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23785561/. 
 207. See Matt Hines, First Serious Facebook Hack?, PC WORLD, Jan. 3, 2008, http://www. 
pcworld.com/article/140994/first_serious_facebook_hack.html. 
 208. Nate Mook, Cross-Site Scripting Worm Hits MySpace, BETANEWS, Oct. 13, 2005, http:// 
www.betanews.com/article/CrossSite_Scripting_Worm_Hits_MySpace/1129232391. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. (describing how the worm spread with exponential speed by infecting the 
account of any user viewing an afflicted profile). 
 211. Lisa Guernsey, Picture Your Name Here, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, Education Life 
Supplement, at 6. 
 212. Cf. Associated Press, Unrepentant on Facebook? Expect Jail Time, CNN.COM, July 18, 2008, 
http://freedom-school.com/reading-room/unrepentant-on-facebook-expect-jail-time.pdf 
(describing increasing use by prosecutors of drunk-driving defendants’ Facebook party photos 
to show lack of remorse). 
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is holding a piece of information that affects her privacy—this is a photo of 
Robyn—but doesn’t respect her preferences about that information. That’s a 
relationship problem. Disagreement and privacy problems go hand-in-hand 
on social network sites. 
A photo tag can involve not just two, but three parties: the 
photographer, the tagger, and the subject. Facebook lets the subject untag 
the photo, but not demand that it be taken down or made private.213 Note 
also that a photo of you that isn’t tagged may not be visible to you, and that 
Facebook also lets users tag photos with the names of nonusers.214 I’d add, 
of course, that any given photo can have multiple people in it, and can be 
tagged by multiple people. These complexities illustrate an important point: 
it’s not easy to uniquely associate each piece of information on a social 
network site with one person. Whoever has control over the information can 
use it in ways that others with legitimate interests in it don’t like.215
This problem is amplified because social network sites require explicit 
representation of social facts. Offline, I can think of you as “my friend Bob 
from work” and loosely associate with that hook my various memories of a 
stressful preparation for an important presentation, a water-balloon fight at 
the company barbeque, and the way you covered for me when I was sick. All 
of these thoughts are implicit. I don’t need to articulate precisely our 
relationship or what goes into it; you’re just Bob, and I can make decisions 
about how much to trust you or what to invite you to in an ad-hoc, 
situational manner, on the basis of all sorts of fuzzy facts and intuitions. But 
Facebook reifies these social facts into explicit links: we’re contacts, or we’re 
not. Everything is explicit and up front—at the cost of flattening our entire 
relationship into a single bit.
 
216 Some sites have tried to deal with this 
information loss by increasing the precision of connections.217 Flickr, for 
example, lets users limit access to their photos to contacts they’ve tagged as 
“friends” or “family.”218
 
 213. Photos, FACEBOOK, 
 But this way lies madness; our social lives are 
http://www.new.facebook.com/help.php?page=412. 
 214. Just because you don’t know about a tagged photo doesn’t mean that other people 
can’t link it back to you if they want. Researchers at CMU were able to do just that with 
Friendster profile pictures using off-the-shelf face-recognition software. See Acquisti & Gross, 
supra note 205, § 4.2.2. 
 215. See Emma Justice, Facebook Suicide: The End of a Virtual Life, TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 
2007, http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/body_and_soul/article245 
2928.ece (describing a user caught between her jealous boyfriend and an ex-boyfriend who 
“had posted up old pictures of us together which I had no power to remove”). 
 216. Cf. Grimmelmann, supra note 134, at 1738–41 (explaining inefficiencies caused by 
software’s insistence on making decisions explicit). 
 217. See Clay Shirky, YASNSes Get Detailed: Two Pictures, MANY2MANY (Mar. 9, 2004), http:// 
many.corante.com/archives/2004/03/09/yasnses_get_detailed_two_pictures.php (discussing 
how Friendster allows users to characterize their friends on a linear scale of friendship). 
 218. See Help, FAQ: Sharing, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/help/sharing/. There’s 
something strange about the question, “Is this photo okay for everyone in your family and no 
one else?” We don’t have to answer categorical, hard-edged questions about privacy and 
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infinitely richer than any controlled vocabulary can comprehend.219 
Consider the RELATIONSHIP project, which aims to provide a “vocabulary 
for describing relationships between people” using thirty-three terms such as 
“apprenticeTo,” “antagonistOf,” “knowsByReputation,” “lostContactWith,” 
and “wouldLikeToKnow.”220 Clay Shirky shows what’s wrong with the entire 
enterprise by pointing out that RELATIONSHIP’s authors left out 
“closePersonalFriendOf,” “usedToSleepWith,” “friendYouDontLike,” and 
every other phrase we could use to describe our real, lived relationships.221 
We shouldn’t expect Facebook’s formal descriptors to be precise 
approximations of the social phenomena they represent.222
Nor should we expect people to agree about them. You think you’re my 
friend; I disagree. We may be able to work together in real life without 
needing to confront the basic fact that you like me but not vice versa. But if 
you Facebook-add me and say, “We dated,” what am I supposed to do? 
Uncheck that box and check “I don’t even know this person”? Divergences 
are made manifest, sometimes to mutual chagrin.
 
223
danah boyd has brilliantly documented one example of the social 
fallout from this fact. MySpace users can choose which “Top Friends” 
(originally eight, though now up to forty) would show up on their profile 
page.
 
224 The feature therefore “requires participants to actively signal their 
relationship with others” in a context where there’s only room for a few 
people inside the velvet rope.225
 
relationships in offline social life. Our brains aren’t good at it. Cf. Heather Richter Lipford et 
al., Understanding Privacy Settings in Facebook with an Audience View, USABILITY PSYCHOL. & 
SECURITY (2008), 
 The result is visible, often painful “drama,” 
particularly among younger users who are negotiating similar status issues in 
http://www.usenix.org/event/upsec08/tech/full_papers/lipford/lipford_ 
html/ (arguing that Facebook could improve users’ ability to understand privacy settings by 
allowing them to view their profiles through others’ eyes). 
 219. See Clay Shirky, RELATIONSHIP: Two Worldviews, MANY2MANY (Mar. 22, 2004), http:// 
many.corante.com/archives/2004/03/22/relationship_two_worldviews.php (“Human social 
calculations are in particular a kind of thing that cannot be made formal or explicit without 
changing them so fundamentally that the model no longer points to the things it is modeled 
on.”). 
 220. Ian Davis & Eric Vitiello Jr., RELATIONSHIP: A Vocabulary for Describing Relationships 
Between People, VOCAB.ORG (Aug. 10, 2005), http://vocab.org/relationship/. 
 221. Clay Shirky, RELATIONSHIP: A Vocabulary for Describing Relationships Between People, 
MANY2MANY (Mar. 16, 2004), http://many.corante.com/archives/2004/03/16/relationship_a_ 
vocabulary_for_describing_relationships_between_people.php. 
 222. Cf. danah boyd, Autistic Social Software, in THE BEST SOFTWARE WRITING I, at 35, 39–41 
(Joel Spolsky ed., 2005) (comparing flattened computer representations of social life to an 
autistic worldview). 
 223. See boyd, supra note 80, at 19 (“Expressing social judgments publicly is akin to airing 
dirty laundry and it is often socially inappropriate to do so. Friend requests on Friendster 
require people to make social judgments about inclusion and exclusion and—more to the 
point—to reveal those decisions.”). 
 224. boyd, supra note 87. 
 225. Id. 
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their school peer groups.226
The most tragic example of disagreement is that of Wayne Forrester, 
who stabbed his estranged wife to death after she changed her Facebook 
relationship status to “single.”
 The fallout from telling a friend she’s not a 
“Top 8” friend is a relationship issue; people joining a social network to 
connect with friends sometimes find instead that they’ve been snubbed. 
227
5. Spillovers 
 Note that it wasn’t their separation that he 
cited as the inciting incident; he’d moved out four days before. Instead, it 
was the status update—the public assertion about a private relationship—
that triggered his derangement. 
What people do on social network sites has privacy consequences for 
others. We’ve already seen how users can upload information—
embarrassing photos, for example—about each other. Recall as well that 
adding contacts is a way to expand your horizon in the social network. That 
point works in reverse. If Hamlet and Gertrude are contacts, then when 
Gertrude accepts Claudius’s contact request, she may compromise Hamlet’s 
privacy from Claudius. Relying on network structure to limit profile visibility 
often means relying on the discretion of your contacts and their contacts. 
But as Clay Shirky observes, “‘[F]riend of a friend of a friend’ is pronounced 
‘stranger.’”228
I can also leak information about you implicitly. If you attend Barnett 
College, many of your Facebook contacts probably attend Barnett College 
too. Even if you don’t list a trait on your profile, it may be possible to infer it 
statistically by looking at the values listed by others in the social network.
 
229 
Researchers using a simple algorithm on LiveJournal were able to predict 
users’ ages and nationalities with good confidence in many cases simply by 
observing the ages and nationalities of their contacts.230
 
 226. Id. 
 How many openly 
gay friends must you have on a social network before you’re outed by 
implication? The identity privacy interests here are clear, but there are also 
community ones. Katherine Strandburg has written about the related 
problem of “relational surveillance,” in which the network structure itself is 
used to infer sensitive information about relationships and group 
 227. Man Killed Wife in Facebook Row, BBC NEWS, Oct. 17, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/uk_news/england/london/7676285.stm. 
 228. Shirky, supra note 217. 
 229. See Jianming He & Wesley W. Chu, Protecting Private Information in Online Social Networks, 
in INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INFORMATICS 249, 260–61 (H. Chen & C.C. Yang eds., 2008), 
http://www.cobase.cs.ucla.edu/tech-docs/jmhek/privacy_protection.pdf (using Bayesian 
inference to predict user interests on Epinions.com). 
 230. Ian MacKinnon & Robert H. Warren, Age and Geographic Inferences of the LiveJournal 
Social Network, in STATISTICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: MODELS, ISSUES, AND NEW DIRECTIONS 176, 
177–78 (Edoardo Airoldi et al. eds., 2006), http://nlg.cs.cmu.edu/icml_sna/paper2_final.pdf. 
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activities.231 The NSA call database is the most famous example of such 
analysis, but in an aside Strandburg perceptively notes that commercial 
profilers are likely to start looking at patterns of association on social 
network sites.232
There’s an important underlying dynamic that makes these spillover 
problems more likely. A social network site in motion tends to grow. We’ve 
seen the various reasons that people add contacts. One of them is 
disproportionately important: it’s hard to say no to a contact request.
 
233 
Because of explicit representation, there’s no way to finesse requests from 
people you’d rather not invite; rather than embarrass both them and 
yourself with a visible rejection, it’s easier just to click on “Confirm.”234 The 
same goes for removing contacts; “I don’t like you as much as I used to” is a 
hard message to send, so we don’t. And so the networks grow.235
This leads not only to large, dense social networks, but also to ones in 
which the social meaning of being a contact is ambiguous. Facebook 
“friends” include not only people we’d call “friends” offline, but also those 
we’d call “acquaintances” (to say nothing of the Fakesters).
 
236 Contact links 
are a mixture of what sociologists would call “strong ties” and “weak ties.”237 
Weak ties are essential for networking (whether it be finding a job or a 
spouse);238
6. Denigration 
 social network sites usefully amplify our limited ability to manage 
weak ties. The price we pay for that networking, however, is that we must 
delegate some of our privacy decisions to people with whom we don’t have 
close relationships. Those are precisely the people who are less likely to 
understand or respect our individual privacy preferences. 
Since a Facebook user’s identity is social—it inheres in the impressions 
she gives and gives off to others239
 
 231. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment 
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 passim (2008). 
—she runs the risk that someone else will 
mutilate it. If so, then the dignitary side of her privacy interest has been 
 232. Id. at 765. 
 233. See boyd, supra note 87 (“[T]here are significant social costs to rejecting someone.”). 
 234. See boyd, supra note 80, at 19 (describing the social pressures associated with friend 
requests). 
 235. The cycle is self-reinforcing. The more weak-tie contact requests you accept, the worse 
the insult of implying that someone fails to meet your already-debased standards. 
 236. See boyd, supra note 80. 
 237. See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973). 
 238. See id. at 1371 (“American blue-collar workers find out about new jobs more through 
personal contacts than by any other method.”); see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING 
POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 30–88 (2000). 
 239. See GOFFMAN, supra note 72, at 2. 
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harmed.240 Two of Solove’s categories are relevant here. There’s distortion—
”being inaccurately characterized”241—and there’s appropriation—”the use of 
one’s identity or personality for the purposes and goals of another.”242 Both 
protect “control of the way one presents oneself to society.”243 A comedy 
sketch broadcast on the BBC, “Facebook in Reality,” dramatizes an 
unwanted Wall post as a “friend” spray-painting crude graffiti on the 
protagonist’s house.244 As we’ve seen, your contacts can also blacken your 
good name by using it to tag embarrassing photos, which Facebook will 
helpfully link to from your profile. If your contacts are feeling cruel, they 
could tag photos of someone else as you. Any parts of a profile page that are 
filled by data supplied by other users could be filled with garbage, explicit 
pornography, or worse.245
You don’t even have to be a Facebook user to be a victim of denigration 
on Facebook. An acquaintance of Matthew Firsht created a fake Facebook 
profile which falsely said that Firsht was looking for “whatever I can get,” that 
he owed large sums of money, and that he was a member of the “Gay in the 
Wood . . . Borehamwood” group.
 
246 This may sound like a classic defamation 
case, and legally, it was (the defendant argued that someone else had 
created the false profile). There’s still, however, a social-network-site angle 
to the harm. The use of Facebook amplified the defamation by increasing its 
credibility: readers would be more likely to assume that Firsht’s profile page 
was, like the typical Facebook profile, actually written by its putative 
author.247
 
 240. See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092–96 (2001) 
(discussing the nexus between dignity and privacy); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures 
of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161–64 (discussing one’s privacy as part of 
one’s dignity and liberty). 
 Similarly, the social dynamics of the site can both encourage 
 241. SOLOVE, supra note 96, at 158–61. 
 242. Id. at 154–58. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Idiots of Ants, Facebook in Reality (BBC television broadcast), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=nrlSkU0TFLs. 
 245. See Clay Shirky, Operation Fuck with the LJ Christians, MANY2MANY (Apr. 8, 2004), 
http://many.corante.com/archives/2004/04/08/operation_fuck_with_the_lj_christians.php 
(describing a LiveJournal prank to fill Christian communities with an image reading, “Hey, 
Assholes, stop trying to cram your religion down my throat, mm-kay”). 
 246. See Jonathan Richards, ‘Fake Facebook Profile’ Victim Awarded £22,000, TIMES (London), 
July 24, 2008, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article4389538. 
ece. 
 247. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rights of Attribution and Integrity in Online Communications, 1995 J. 
ONLINE L. art. 2, ¶¶ 30–39, http://web.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/lemley.html?svr= 
law (discussing possible privacy torts for impersonation); see also Jail for Facebook Spoof Moroccan, 
BBC NEWS, Feb. 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7258950.stm (reporting on a 
three-year jail sentence for an engineer who created a false Facebook profile of a Moroccan 
prince). 
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groups to egg each other on into anti-social behavior248 and encourage the 
rapid spread of false information.249
Finally, consider Facebook’s Beacon. Not everything I buy or do online 
reflects me as I’d like to be seen; perhaps I bought that copy of “Bio-Dome” 
for my Pauly Shore obsessed six-year-old nephew.
 Even what your contacts do with their 
own profiles reflects on you; they’re your contacts after all. 
250 That’s a distortion to 
the extent that associating it with me impugns my judgment and my honor. 
Even if I bought this “movie” for myself, I can still have a reputational 
interest in keeping that fact confidential. Social-network-site profiles are 
carefully calibrated to present the persona users want to present. If I’ve gone 
to some effort to list only French New Wave cinema, “Bio-Dome” hits me 
where it hurts: in my identity. William McGeveran persuasively argues that 
Beacon also has an appropriation problem.251 Putting an advertisement for 
“Bio-Dome” in my News Feed hijacks my persona—my reputation and 
credibility with my contacts—for its commercial endorsement value.252
* * * 
 
The story of social network sites is the story of what danah boyd calls 
“social convergence.”253 Our social roles are contextual and audience-
specific, but when multiple audiences are present simultaneously, it may not 
be possible to keep up both performances at once.254
 
 248. See, e.g., Benjamin Ryan, The Case of the Facebook Four, NOW LEB., Jan. 23, 2008, 
 The stories we’ve just 
seen are stories of convergence; Facebook performances leak outwards, 
while facts inconsistent with our Facebook performances leak inwards. The 
paradox of Facebook is that the same mechanisms that help it create new 
http:// 
www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=27719 (reporting on the arrest of four 
Lebanese men for “making crude and harassing remarks on a Facebook group dedicated to a 
female student” and on each others’ Walls). 
 249. See, e.g., Charles Mandel, Dalhousie Halts Defamatory Facebook Group, GAZETTE 
(Montreal), Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id= 
c8f236f0-bab2-4be1-913f-e8ecc9316ab8 (describing Dalhousie University’s response to the 
15,000-member Facebook Group named “Stop Dogs and Puppies from being murdered at 
Dalhousie University”). 
 250. See Bio-Dome, METACRITIC, http://www.metacritic.com/video/titles/biodome (giving 
“Bio-Dome” a one on a scale of zero to one hundred—the lowest all-time score on Metacritic’s 
average of critics’ movie ratings—a rating Metacritic describes as “extreme dislike or disgust”). 
 251. William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 252. In addition to the identity interests encompassed by appropriation and distortion, 
Beacon may also improperly piggyback on users’ relationships with their contacts. Channels 
created for social purposes are misused for commercial ones; Beacon tricks the unintentional 
endorser into betraying her friend’s expectations of loyalty within the relationship. That’s a 
relationship-based harm. Solove might call it breach of confidence. See SOLOVE, supra note 97, at 
136–40. 
 253. danah boyd, Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence, 14 
CONVERGENCE 13, 19–20 (2008), http://www.danah.org/papers/FacebookPrivacyTrainwreck. 
pdf. 
 254. See GOFFMAN, supra note 72 at 137–40. 
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social contexts also help it juxtapose them. It offers social differentiation but 
delivers convergence—which its users experience as a violation of privacy. 
III. WHAT WON’T WORK 
People who use social network sites get deeply upset about many of the 
privacy-violating things that happen to them there. If we can avert some of 
those harms without causing worse ones in the process, we ought to. 
Sometimes law will be the best tool for the job; at other times changes to 
software will be better. In other cases, keeping our hands off and letting the 
market or social norms do the job will do more good.255
The problem for policymakers is that many seemingly plausible “fixes” 
for Facebook actually make things worse. This Part will show how 
interventions that don’t think about Facebook’s social dynamics can go 
catastrophically wrong. When an intervention interferes with users’ 
perceptions of their social environment, they become disoriented and may 
act in even riskier ways. Worse, when an intervention keeps users from doing 
what they want to, they fight back. 
 (Of course, we can’t 
and shouldn’t worry about preventing every privacy harm that results from 
Facebook use; just as the law ignores most insults offline, it should ignore 
most insults on Facebook.) 
A. MARKET FORCES 
One possible response to privacy concerns is the default: do nothing. 
On this point of view, while privacy harms are costly, so too is privacy-
protecting regulation. If left to their own devices, businesses will naturally 
sort out an optimal level of privacy protection by offering consumers as 
much privacy as they actually value.256 If the government intervenes, it may 
artificially distort markets in favor of some technologies and against 
others,257 while depriving consumers of the benefits of personalized online 
experiences.258
We have good reason to believe that this assumption is false for social 
network sites. The problem is that there’s a consistent difference between 
 This is a powerful argument, but it depends critically on the 
assumption that market forces will converge on giving users the level of 
privacy they truly desire. 
 
 255. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85–99 (1999). 
 256. See generally PAUL H. RUBIN & THOMAS M. LENERD, PRIVACY AND THE COMMERCIAL USE 
OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (2002) (finding no failures in the market for personal information 
and recommending against government intervention). 
 257. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud 8–10 (Univ. 
Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 414, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1151985 (discussing how limiting competition can create market power for some 
firms). 
 258. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1213–
18. 
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how much privacy users expect when they sign up for a social network site 
and how much they get.259
The social causes of this gap should be familiar by now. Social-network-
site users don’t think rationally about the privacy risks involved due to all 
sorts of deeply wired cognitive biases. Social network sites change their 
architecture in ways that defeat earlier privacy expectations. Sometimes—as 
when Facebook allows photo tagging of nonusers—the people who’ve 
suffered a privacy loss aren’t in a position to negotiate effectively.
 That’s a market failure; if users overestimate how 
much privacy they’ll get, they won’t negotiate for enough, and companies 
will rationally respond by undersupplying it. In order to have a well-
functioning market for social network sites there would need to be a 
feedback loop; instead, there’s a gap. 
260
Later regret about initial openness is an especially serious problem for 
the most active social-network-site users: young people.
 
261 People are time-
inconsistent; they care more about privacy as they age.262 Teens in particular 
are notorious risk-takers; they do dangerous things, like smoke and drive 
recklessly, that they later regret, even when given accurate information 
about the risks.263
Jonathan Zittrain’s work on generative technologies also suggests why 
the social dynamics of social network sites do not tend towards equilibrium. 
 Even if people generally develop more accurate 
expectations about how social network sites work and the privacy risks 
involved, hundreds of thousands of children come online each year: people 
who by definition don’t have much experience in what to expect in terms of 
online privacy. It’s quite plausible that these hundreds of thousands of new 
users form accurate expectations about the privacy risks only by being 
burned. That wouldn’t be good. 
 
 259. See Edwards & Brown, supra note 143, at 18–20. 
 260. The intuitive reason why Facebook can’t internalize the tagged nonuser’s privacy 
preferences is that if Facebook knows her name and what she looks like but nothing else about 
her, it’s not in a position to find out how much she’d pay not to be tagged. The more subtle 
reason is that there’s a structural difference between a Facebook user choosing the terms of her 
participation and a nonuser potentially being tagged by any social network site. The former 
situation is bilateral; if the user and Facebook reach a satisfactory agreement, that’s the end of 
the matter. The latter situation is multilateral; even if the nonuser pays Facebook to go away, 
MySpace and Bebo and every other site could still tag her. The transaction costs are prohibitive 
unless the nonuser has a property-style in rem exclusionary right at the outset. 
 261. See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND SOCIAL 
MEDIA 13 (2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2007/PIP_Teens_ 
Social_Media_Final.pdf.pdf (finding that fifty-five percent of online teens had a social network 
profile compared with twenty percent of older users). 
 262. See, e.g., Emily Gould, Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, § Magazine, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/magazine/25internet-t.html (describing how a writer 
who chronicled her romantic life on her blogs gradually came to regret it). 
 263. See Susan Hanley Duncan, MySpace Is Also Their Space: Ideas for Keeping Children Safe from 
Sexual Predators on Social-Networking Sites, 96 KY. L.J. 527, 554–57 (2008) (explaining that teens 
may make decisions that develop into “addictions and unhealthy patterns of behavior later in 
life”). 
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Social network sites are socially generative platforms: their users can socially 
reconfigure them in new, unexpected, and valuable ways.264 But Zittrain also 
shows how generative technologies can be victims of their own success.265 
When sites are small, the social flexibility that makes them compelling also 
helps users predict and enforce privacy norms. But popularity leads to heavy 
stress on its early, informal social norms as new users flood in.266
Most people believe that security through obscurity will serve as a 
functional barrier online. For the most part, this is a reasonable 
assumption. Unless someone is of particular note or interest, why 
would anyone search for them? Unfortunately for teens, there are 
two groups who have a great deal of interest in them: those who 
hold power over them—parents, teachers, local government 
officials, etc.—and those who wish to prey on them—marketers and 
predators. Before News Corporation purchased MySpace, most 
adults had never heard of the site; afterwards, they flocked there 
either to track teenagers that they knew or to market goods (or 
promises) to any teen who would listen. This shift ruptured both 
the imagined community and the actual audience they had to face 
on a regular basis.
 Early 
privacy expectations fall apart. danah boyd’s description of MySpace’s 
growth shows the dynamic: 
267
Indeed, given the enthusiasm with which the young have embraced 
semi-public online media, we as a society will have some serious issues in 
getting to the steady state needed for the market-equilibrium theory of 
privacy choices to hold. The divergence in privacy norms between heavily 
wired teens and their parents (to say nothing of their grandparents) is 
striking; the personal information already online would suffice to ruin the 
political careers of millions of young people if they were judged by the 
standards we apply to adult politicians.
 
268
 
 264. This is the story danah boyd tells about Fakesters on Friendster. boyd, supra note 80, at 
22–29. It’s also the story that T.L. Taylor tells about EverQuest, T.L. TAYLOR, PLAY BETWEEN 
WORLDS 136–50 (2006), that Katie Hafner tells about the Well, HAFNER, supra note 165, at 25–
37, and that Howard Rheingold tells about USENET and BBSes, RHEINGOLD, supra note 70, at 
110–44. 
 That overhang of personal 
 265. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 67–100 
(2008), http://futureoftheinternet.org/static/ZittrainTheFutureoftheInternet.pdf (discussing 
generative patterns); Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1980–
96 (2006) (defining “generative” technologies). 
 266. See, e.g., WENDY M. GROSSMAN, NET.WARS 4–41 (1998) (describing stresses on USENET 
culture caused by an influx of spammers and AOL users). 
 267. boyd, supra note 86, at 133 (emphasis added). 
 268. Emily Nussbaum, Say Everything, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 12, 2007, at 24 http://nymag.com/ 
news/features/27341 (“More young people are putting more personal information out in 
public than any older person ever would—and yet they seem mysteriously healthy and normal, 
save for an entirely different definition of privacy.”). 
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information isn’t going away; either society will significantly adjust its privacy 
norms or a lot of people are going to have some lifelong regrets about their 
youthful Internet indiscretions.269
B. PRIVACY POLICIES 
 Either way, the precondition for market 
forces to work effectively—stable privacy preferences—fails. The market 
prescription leaves matters in the hands of instability-producing social 
dynamics. 
Some privacy scholars, companies, and regulators support an informed-
choice model of online privacy.270 On this view, government shouldn’t 
regulate any specific privacy standards; instead, it should make sure that 
companies clearly tell consumers what will be done with their personal 
information.271 Armed with good information, consumers will make good 
choices. The traditional focus of this approach is the privacy policy; if a site’s 
privacy policy is clear and honest, its users will know what they’re getting 
into and will approve of the consequences.272
An examination of Facebook’s privacy policy shows that the informed-
choice model is completely unrealistic. Everything the model knows is 
wrong; there’s no room in it for the social dynamics of how people actually 
make privacy-affecting decisions. Facebook’s beautifully drafted privacy 
policy ought to be Exhibit A for informed choice: it bears a TRUSTe seal
 
273 
and contains reassuring statements such as “We share your information with 
third parties only in limited circumstances” and “Facebook takes appropriate 
precautions to protect our users’ information.”274
 
 269. Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH 
ON THE INTERNET (Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore eds., forthcoming 2010) (on file with the 
Iowa Law Review). 
 Nonetheless, Facebook 
users don’t read it, don’t understand it, don’t rely on it and certainly aren’t 
protected by it. It’s a beautiful irrelevancy. In the first place, most people 
don’t read privacy policies, and even those users who do read them 
generally don’t understand them. Facebook users are no exception. A 2001 
poll found that only three percent of the people surveyed claimed to read 
 270. See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as 
Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 110–26 (2007) (proposing federal legislation 
to mandate effective informed choice). 
 271. Note the absence of substantive regulations from industry policy statements such as 
SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, SIAA FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (2001), http:// 
www.siia.net/govt/docs/pub/priv_brief_fairinfo.pdf. 
 272. The approach is typified in, for example, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FAIR INFORMATION 
PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm. 
 273. Facebook remains in good standing with TRUSTe. Validated Privacy Statement for 
www.facebook.com, TRUSTE, http://www.truste.org/ivalidate.php?url=www.facebook.com&sealid 
=101. 
 274. Facebook Principles, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php. 
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privacy policies carefully “most of the time,”275 and a 2007 poll found that 
thirty-one percent claimed to do so.276 Studies have also found that although 
the consumers surveyed claimed to care about privacy and to look to see 
whether sites had privacy policies, large majorities of them were badly 
misinformed about what those policies actually said.277 A 2006 survey of 
Facebook users found that seventy-seven percent had never read its privacy 
policy and that large majorities had mistaken beliefs about how Facebook 
collected and shared personal information.278 Even the twenty-three percent 
who claimed to have read the policy were no more likely to understand what 
it allowed.279 It’s hard to fault them; if all Americans actually read the 
privacy policies of all the sites they visited, they’d be using up $365 billion 
worth of their time.280
If its users did read Facebook’s privacy policy closely—and even more 
counterfactually, if they understood it—they’d know that it doesn’t restrict 
Facebook’s activities in any genuinely significant ways. Here’s the paragraph 
that disclaims any responsibility for actual privacy in no uncertain terms: 
 Between the lawyerly caution, the weasel words, the 
commingling of many standard terms with the occasional surprising one, the 
legally mandated warnings and disclaimers, and the legalese, most privacy 
policies have a painfully low signal-to-noise ratio. 
You post User Content (as defined in the Facebook Terms of Use) 
on the Site at your own risk. Although we allow you to set privacy 
options that limit access to your pages, please be aware that no 
security measures are perfect or impenetrable. We cannot control 
the actions of other Users with whom you may choose to share your 
pages and information. Therefore, we cannot and do not guarantee 
that User Content you post on the Site will not be viewed by unauthorized 
persons. We are not responsible for circumvention of any privacy 
settings or security measures contained on the Site. You 
 
 275. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., PRIVACY LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE, PRIVACY NOTICES RESEARCH 
FINAL RESULTS 2 (2002), http://www.bbbonline.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/datasum. 
pdf (telephone poll conducted Nov. 9–14, 2001). 
 276. Zogby Poll: Most Americans Worry About Identity Theft, ZOGBY INT’L, Apr. 3, 2007, http:// 
www.zogby.com/NEWS/readnews.cfm?ID=1275 (online survey conducted Mar. 23–26, 2007). 
 277. TUROW, AMERICANS AND ONLINE PRIVACY, supra note 203, at 18; TUROW ET AL., OPEN 
TO EXPLOITATION, supra note 203, at 17–19. The percentage of adults using the Internet at 
home who incorrectly believed that the mere existence of a privacy policy meant that the site 
offering it would not share personal information with third parties was fifty-seven percent in 
2003, TUROW, AMERICANS AND ONLINE PRIVACY, supra note 203, at 3, and fifty-nine percent in 
2005, TUROW ET AL., OPEN TO EXPLOITATION, supra note 203, at 20. 
 278. Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information 
Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: SIXTH 
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP 36, 54 (George Danezis & Philippe Golle eds., 2006), http:// 
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/facebook/facebook2.pdf. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, I/S: 
J. OF L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y (forthcoming). 
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understand and acknowledge that, even after removal, copies of 
User Content may remain viewable in cached and archived pages 
or if other Users have copied or stored your User Content.281
Facebook also warns users that it may retain data on them even after 
they delete their accounts, that it may surveil them even when they’re not 
using Facebook, that it uses their information for marketing purposes 
(including targeted ads), that it retains discretion over whether and when to 
share their information with third parties, and that sometimes Facebook 
even deliberately gives out accounts to let outsiders see what’s going on 
inside.
 
282 The bottom line, as Facebook repeats near the end of the policy, is 
that any personal information users upload “may become publicly 
available.”283
Moreover, to the extent that it has any binding effect at all, Facebook’s 
privacy policy binds only Facebook. There are plenty of other actors, 
including other users, Application developers, and law enforcement agents, 
who can use Facebook’s data to invade privacy. In 2005 two MIT students 
were able to download over 70,000 profiles—over seventy percent of the 
profiles from the four schools in their study—using an automated script.
 
284 
In late June 2008, Facebook suspended Top Friends, its third-most popular 
Application (with over a million users285), for privacy violations.286 Of 
course, Facebook’s privacy policy explicitly warns readers that Facebook has 
no control over other users, Application developers, or the legal system.287 
(Indeed, if some accounts in the blogosphere are to be believed, Facebook 
has trouble controlling its own employees, who treat access to profile and 
user-activity information as a “job perk.”288
We can put one last nail in the coffin of the informed-choice theory: 
Facebook’s reputation on privacy matters is terrible. When people use 
“Facebook” and “privacy” in the same sentence, the word in between is never 
) 
 
 281. Facebook Principles, supra note 274 (emphasis added). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Harvey Jones & José Hiram Soltren, Facebook: Threats to Privacy 13 (Dec. 14, 2005) 
(unpublished class paper), http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/student-papers/fall05-papers/ 
facebook.pdf. 
 285. Top Friends, FACEBOOK, http://apps.facebook.com/apps/application.php?id=2425 
101550. 
 286. Justin Smith, Breaking: Top Friends Vanishes from Facebook Platform, INSIDE FACEBOOK 
(June 26, 2008), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2008/06/26/breaking-top-friends-vanishes-
from-facebook-platform/. 
 287. Facebook Principles, supra note 274. 
 288. Nick Douglas, Facebook Employees Know What Profiles You Look At, VALLEYWAG (Oct. 27, 
2007), http://valleywag.com/tech/scoop/facebook-employees-know-what-profiles-you-look-at-
315901.php. See generally Owen Thomas, Why Facebook Employees Are Profiling Users, VALLEYWAG, 
http://valleywag.com/tech/your-privacy-is-an-illusion/why-facebook-employees-are-profiling-
users-316469.php (Oct. 29, 2007) (collecting posts on Facebook employee misbehavior). 
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“protects.”289 Facebook’s privacy missteps haven’t just drawn the attention of 
bloggers, journalists, scholars, watchdog groups,290 and regulators291; they’ve 
also sparked mass outrage among Facebook users. An anti-Beacon group 
attracted over 70,000 members292 and an anti-News Feed group over 
700,000. 293 Facebook’s pattern—launch a problematic feature, offer a ham-
handed response to initial complaints, and ultimately make a partial 
retreat—hasn’t given it much privacy credibility.294 In short, consumers 
don’t, can’t, couldn’t, and shouldn’t rely on Facebook’s privacy policy to 
protect their personal information as they use the site.295
C. TECHNICAL CONTROLS 
 
Some scholars think that one of the better ways to protect privacy on 
Facebook is to give users better technical controls on who can see their 
personal information.296
By choosing to make their profile private, teens are able to select 
who can see their content. This prevents unwanted parents from 
lurking, but it also means that peers cannot engage with them 
without inviting them to be Friends. To handle this, teens are often 
 But, as danah boyd’s ethnography of teenage 
MySpace users illustrates, social factors undermine technical controls: 
 
 289. I’m not exaggerating. Searches on Google, Yahoo, MSN, and Lexis (News, All 
(English, Full Text)) produced zero results for the phrase “Facebook protects privacy.” 
 290. See, e.g., Letter from Philippa Lawson, Dir., Canadian Internet Policy & Pub. Interest 
Clinic, to Comm’r Stoddart, Privacy Comm’n of Can. (May 30, 2008), http://www.cippic.ca/ 
uploads/CIPPICFacebookComplaint_29May08.pdf [hereinafter PIPEDA Facebook Complaint] 
(detailing complaints against Facebook under the Personal Information and Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act by Lawson on behalf of law students); Facebook Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY 
INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/default.html (collecting news and resources). 
 291. Chris Vallance, Facebook Faces Privacy Questions, BBC NEWS, Jan. 18, 2008, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7196803.stm (describing an investigation of Facebook by the U.K. 
Information Commissioner’s Office). 
 292. Petition: Facebook, Stop Invading My Privacy!, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ 
group.php?gid=5930262681 (72,314 members on Facebook as of Mar. 17, 2009) 
 293. Story & Stone, supra note 52. 
 294. See danah boyd, Will Facebook Learn from Its Mistake?, APOPHENIA, http://www. 
zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2006/09/07/will_facebook_l.html (Sept. 7, 2006) (describing 
the pattern). 
 295. See generally JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND CONSUMER 
PRIVACY IN THE COMING DECADE (2006), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/techade/pdfs/ 
Turow-and-Hoofnagle1.pdf (criticizing the informed-choice model and calling for substantive 
regulation). 
 296. See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET 200–03 (2007) (discussing problems with current controls on who can see personal 
information); Edwards & Brown, supra note 143, at 17–23; see also Jonathan Zittrain, What the 
Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1226–40 (discussing use of technical measures to provide detailed control 
over private medical information). 
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promiscuous with who they are willing to add as Friends on the 
site.297
The fact is, there’s a deep, probably irreconcilable tension between the 
desire for reliable control over one’s information and the desire for 
unplanned social interaction.
 
298 It’s deeply alien to the human mind to 
manage privacy using rigid ex ante rules. We think about privacy in terms of 
social rules and social roles, not in terms of access-control lists and file 
permissions.299
Facebook’s experience provides strong evidence of the limited 
usefulness of technical controls. One of Facebook’s two “core principles” is 
that users “should have control over [their] personal information,”
 Thus, when given the choice, users almost always spurn or 
misuse technical controls, turning instead to social norms of 
appropriateness and to informal assessments of practical obscurity. 
300 and it 
implements this principle by offering users a staggeringly comprehensive set 
of privacy options presented in a clean, attractive interface.301 Chris Kelly, its 
Chief Privacy Officer, called its controls “extensive and precise” in testimony 
to Congress, and emphasized that Facebook’s goal was “to give users . . . 
effective control over their information” through its “privacy 
architecture.”302
Not that it matters. Surveys show that many users either don’t care 
about or don’t understand how Facebook’s software-based privacy settings 
work. One study by the U.K. Office of Communications found that almost 
half of social-network-site users left their privacy settings on the default.
 He’s not blowing smoke; Facebook has the most 
comprehensive privacy-management interface I’ve ever seen. Facebook users 
have greater technical control over the visibility of their personal 
information than do users of any of its major competitors. 
303
 
 297. boyd, supra note 86, at 132 (emphasis added). 
 
Another study by a security vendor found that a similar fraction of Facebook 
users were willing to add a plastic frog as a contact, thereby leaking personal 
 298. See Gelman, supra note 177. 
 299. See Nissenbaum, supra note 198, at 155. 
 300. Facebook Principles, supra note 274. 
 301. See Naomi Gleit, More Privacy Options, FACEBOOK BLOG, http://blog.facebook.com/ 
blog.php?post=11519877130 (Mar. 19, 2008) (describing Facebook’s new privacy interface and 
options). 
 302. Privacy Implications of Online Advertising: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, 
& Transportation, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Chris Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer of 
Facebook), http://www.insidefacebook.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/chriskellyfacebook 
onlineprivacytestimony.pdf. 
 303. OFFICE OF COMMC’NS, SOCIAL NETWORKING: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH REPORT INTO ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOURS, AND USE 8 (2008), http://www.ofcom.org.uk/ 
advice/media_literacy/medlitpub/medlitpubrss/socialnetworking/report.pdf. 
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information to it.304 A study of college students found that between twenty 
and thirty percent didn’t know how Facebook’s privacy controls worked, 
how to change them, or even whether they themselves ever had.305 Indeed, 
more detailed technical controls can be worse for privacy than less detailed 
ones. Computer users are often confused by complex interfaces306 and can 
easily be talked into overriding security measures designed to protect 
them.307
The deeper problems are social. There are no ideal technical controls 
for the use of information in social software. The very idea is an oxymoron; 
“social” and “technical” are incompatible adjectives here. Adding 
“FriendYouDontLike” to a controlled vocabulary will not make it socially 
complete; there’s still “FriendYouDidntUsedToLike.” As long as there are 
social nuances that aren’t captured in the rules of the network (i.e., always), 
the network will be unable to prevent them from sparking privacy blowups. 
Marc Chiles and Adam Gartner would have liked a technical control that 
would have allowed them to say that they’re friends, unless it’s the police 
asking, in which case they’re not friends. Facebook could add such a 
control, but that way lies madness. Increased granularity can also make 
problems of disagreement worse. Maybe Chiles would have been willing to 
acknowledge the friendship to members of the “College Administrators” 
group, but Gartner wouldn’t have. If Facebook adds that option, the two of 
them have something new to argue about—or worse, to be unpleasantly 
surprised by when one realizes that the other’s privacy settings have just 
gotten him busted. 
 Complexity also requires more maintenance, and Facebook has 
already gotten into trouble by changing privacy controls with which users 
were familiar. 
Another reason that comprehensive technical controls are ineffective 
can be found in Facebook’s other “core principle”: that its users should 
“have access to the information others want to share.”308
 
 304. Sophos Facebook ID Probe Shows 41% of Users Happy to Reveal All to Potential Identity Thieves, 
SOPHOS (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2007/08/ 
facebook.html. 
 If you’re already 
sharing your information with Alice, checking the box that says “Don’t show 
to Bob” will stop Facebook from showing it Bob, but it won’t stop Alice from 
showing it to him. Miss New Jersey, Amy Polumbo, wanted her friends to 
have access to photos of her dressed up as a salacious Alice in Wonderland; 
 305. Acquisti & Gross, supra note 278, at 16. 
 306. See Roger Dingledine & Nick Mathewson, Anonymity Loves Company: Usability and the 
Network Effect, in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT PEOPLE CAN USE 
547, 552 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005) (“Extra options often delegate 
security decisions to those least able to understand what they imply.”). 
 307. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES 266–69 (2000) (“Social engineering [i.e. 
convincing a computer user to trust you through non-technical means] bypasses cryptography, 
computer security, network security, and everything else technological.”). 
 308. Facebook Principles, supra note 274. 
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if one of them couldn’t be trusted, that was the friend’s fault, and all the 
technical controls in the world wouldn’t have helped Polumbo. If we’ve 
learned anything at all from the digital-rights-management wars, it’s that 
technical controls are rarely effective against a person genuinely determined 
to redistribute information they’ve been given access to.309
There’s also another way of looking at “information others want to 
share.” If I want to share information about myself—and since I’m using a 
social network site, it’s all but certain that I do—anything that makes it 
harder for me to share is a bug, not a feature. Users will disable any feature 
that protects their privacy too much.
 
310 The defaults problem nicely 
illustrates this point. Lillian Edwards and Ian Brown flirt with the idea that 
default “privacy settings be set at the most privacy-friendly setting when a 
profile is first set up,” only to recognize that “this is not a desirable start state 
for social networking.”311
D. COMMERCIAL DATA COLLECTION RULES 
 If Facebook profiles started off hidden by default, 
the next thing each user would do after creating it would be to turn off the 
invisibility. Social needs induce users to jump over technological hurdles. 
H. Brian Holland has observed that while users share individually and 
for social reasons, Facebook’s role as a platform gives it access to everyone’s 
data.312 Large concentrations of personal data in the hands of a single entity 
raise serious and well-known privacy concerns. One concern is that the 
government may misuse the data for illegitimate investigations.313
 
 309. See Cory Doctorow, European Affairs Coordinator, Elec. Frontier Found., DRM Talk 
for Hewlett-Packard Research (Sept. 28, 2005), 
 Another is 
that the entity itself may misuse the data, whether for marketing or by 
turning it over to third parties. There are plenty of other contexts in which it 
http://craphound.com/hpdrm.txt (applying 
lessons to conclude that “privacy DRM” cannot work). 
 310. See Bruce Tognazzini, Design for Usability, in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING 
SECURE SYSTEMS THAT PEOPLE CAN USE, supra note 306, at 31, 32 (“Unless you stand over them 
with a loaded gun, users will disable, evade, or avoid any security system that proves to be too 
burdensome or bothersome.”). 
 311. Edwards & Brown, supra note 143, at 22; see also Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting 
Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 583, 589–97 (2006) (emphasizing the power of defaults). 
 312. H. Brian Holland, Visiting Assoc. Professor, Penn. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. of Law, 
Presentation at the Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference, New Haven, Conn. (May 21, 
2008) (video of a similar presentation of the same material is available at http://www.ethics 
andtechnology.eu/index.php/news/comments/privacy_in_social_network_sites_videos_and_sli
des/). 
 313. See Matthew J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the “New” 
Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 106–07 (2006) (discussing whether 
users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data revealed to social network sites). 
A1 - GRIMMELMANN_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:44 PM 
1188 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
makes sense to ask whether platform operators have too much power over 
their users.314
These are important concerns, but they’re orthogonal to the privacy 
issues detailed above. Even if the government left Facebook completely 
alone, and Facebook showed no advertisements to its users, and no other 
company ever had access to Facebook’s data, most of the problems we’ve 
seen would remain. Amy Polumbo’s would-be blackmailer wasn’t a 
government agent or a data miner, just someone in her social network with a 
little ill will towards her. That’s typical of the problems we’ve seen in this 
Article: we worry about what our parents, friends, exes, and employers will 
see, just as much as we worry about what malevolent strangers will see. 
 
In other words, these are peer-produced privacy violations. Yochai 
Benkler describes peer production as a mode of “information production 
that is not based on exclusive proprietary claims, not aimed toward sales in a 
market for either motivation or information, and not organized around 
property and contract claims to form firms or market exchanges.”315 That’s 
a fair description of Facebook culture: users voluntarily sharing information 
with each other for diverse reasons, both personal and social. They don’t use 
intellectual property to control Wall posts, they don’t buy and sell their 
social capital (except in jest316
As we’ve seen, however, when it comes to private information, a 
genuine commons is the last thing we want. The same sharing-friendly 
platform, diversely social motivations, and enormous userbase that make 
Facebook compelling and valuable also make it a privacy nightmare. The 
privacy violations are bottom-up; they emerge spontaneously from the 
), and they don’t organize themselves 
hierarchically. Facebook has the essential features of an information 
commons. 
 
 314. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for 
Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263 (2008) (claiming that arguments for 
imposing limits on the exercise of power by network providers also justify imposing limits on 
the exercise of power by search engines). 
 315. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 105 (2006). See generally Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: 
Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001) (deploying the concept of peer 
production); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE 
L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing peer production at length and in detail). 
 316. See, e.g., Brian Morrissey, BK Offers Facebook ‘Sacrifice,’ ADWEEK (Jan. 8, 2009), http:// 
www.adweek.com/aw/content_display/news/digital/e3i9953839003c11ce8bbf5f762069ef9ba. 
The article notes that: 
[Burger King’s Whopper Sacrifice Facebook Application] rewards 
people with a coupon for BK’s signature burger when they cull 10 
friends. Each time a friend is excommunicated, the application sends a 
notification to the banished party via Facebook’s news feed explaining 
that the user’s love for the unlucky soul is less than his or her zeal for 
the Whopper. 
Id. 
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natural interactions of users with different tastes, goals, and expectations. 
The dark side of a peer-to-peer individual-empowering ecology is that it 
empowers individuals to spread information about each other. 
These are not concerns about powerful entities looking down on the 
network from above; they’re concerns about individuals looking at each 
other from ground level. Even if Facebook were perfectly ethical and 
completely discreet, users would still create false profiles, snoop on each 
other, and struggle over the bounds of the private. For this reason, while 
reports dealing with privacy and other platforms often propose strong 
restrictions on data collection and transfer, the focus of reports on social-
network-site privacy is appropriately elsewhere. 317
Consider the complaint filed against Facebook under Canada’s 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) 
by a student clinic at the University of Ottawa.
 
318 While the clinic certainly 
knows how to draft hard-hitting complaints that object to data collection or 
transfers to third parties,319 its Facebook complaint focuses instead on 
improving Facebook’s disclosure of its practices to its users and on enabling 
users who wish to quit Facebook to remove their information from it.320 
European reports from the International Working Group on Data 
Protection in Telecommunications (“IWGDPT”)321
 
 317. See, e.g., Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman, Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, to Peter Fleischer, Privacy Counsel, Google (May 16, 2007), 
 and the European 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_ 
home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_google_16_05_07_en.pdf (expressing concern over the 
length of time that Google retains query logs); Complaint at 10–11, In re Google, Inc. & 
DoubleClick, Inc., FTC File No. 071-0170 (Apr. 20, 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ 
epic_complaint.pdf (requesting an injunction to prevent data transfers between Google and 
DoubleClick as part of proposed merger). 
 318. PIPEDA Facebook Complaint, supra note 290. PIPEDA fits squarely within the usual 
framework for thinking about the privacy obligations owed by platform operators to users: a 
collection of principles known as the Fair Information Practices. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., 
& WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973). Although the FTC and 
state attorneys general sometimes target companies that egregiously misrepresent their privacy 
practices to users, they’re not part of U.S. statutory law. See Ciocchetti, supra note 270, at 72–98 
(describing the current U.S. privacy-practices enforcement framework). Internationally, they’ve 
been more popular: for example, the European Union’s Data Protection Directive seeks to 
protect individuals from nonconsensual data collection. Council Directive 95/46/EC art. 1, 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38. 
 319. See, e.g., Letter from Philippa Lawson, Dir., Can. Internet Policy & Pub. Interest Clinic, 
to Comm’r Stoddart, Privacy Comm’n of Can. 3–7 (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.cippic. 
ca/documents/privacy/Ticketmaster-OPCCletter.pdf (objecting under PIPEDA to 
unconsented marketing and transfer of customer information to Ticketmaster affiliates). 
 320. See PIPEDA Facebook Complaint, supra note 290, at 11–32. 
 321. INT’L WORKING GROUP ON DATA PROT. IN TELECOMM., REPORT AND GUIDANCE ON 
PRIVACY IN SOCIAL NETWORK SERVICES (2008), http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/attachments/ 
461/WP_social_network_services.pdf [hereinafter IWGDPT REPORT]. 
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Network and Information Security Agency (“ENISA”)322
The reason that these privacy advocates are reluctant to apply 
restrictions on data transfer too rigorously is that if they did, it could kill off 
social network sites completely, baby and bathwater together. As the 
IWGDPT report acknowledges, “[M]ost of the personal information 
published in social network services is being published at the initiative of 
users and based on their consent.”
 similarly focus on 
improving communications with users rather than on stronger restrictions 
on data collection and transfer. 
323
E.  USE RESTRICTIONS 
 Social network sites that couldn’t 
collect or distribute personal information couldn’t function—and users 
would be frustrated, rather than relieved. Commercial data-collection rules 
are inappropriate because they treat the problem as commercial, not social. 
Our next bad idea comes out of the moral panic over online sexual 
predators.324 Social network sites, like chat rooms before them, are seen as a 
place where “predators” find children and lure them into abusive sexual 
relationships.325 While recent studies show that these fears are substantially 
overblown,326 some children do in fact meet their abusers through social 
network sites.327
Unfortunately, some legislators and attorneys general think that the 
solution is to severely limit access to social network sites. The Deleting 
Online Predators Act of 2006 (“DOPA”) passed in the House during the 
109th Congress but died in the Senate in committee.
 
328
 
 322. EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, SECURITY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS (2007), http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_ 
pp_social_networks.pdf. 
 The Act would have 
required libraries and schools to install Internet filters on computers to 
 323. IWGDPT REPORT, supra note 321, at 1. 
 324. See Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social 
Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 73–78 (2007) (attributing the fears of sexual 
predators on social network sites to a generation gap). 
 325. See, e.g., Julie Rawe, How Safe Is MySpace?, TIME, July 3, 2006, at 34. 
 326. See Janis Wolak et al., Online “Predators” and Their Victims: Myths, Realities, and 
Implications for Prevention and Treatment, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 111 passim (2008) (summarizing 
the conclusions of multiple surveys). The authors concluded that most victims know they are 
dealing with adults, id. at 112, that most victims go to face-to-face encounters expecting sexual 
activity, id. at 113, that Internet-initiated contacts were responsible for about seven percent of 
statutory rapes, id. at 115, that putting personal information online was not a predictor of 
receiving sexual solicitations, id. at 117, that social-network-site usage was not associated with 
increased risk, id., and that claims of increased sexual offenses due to the Internet “remain 
speculations as yet unsupported by research findings,” id. at 120. 
 327. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims 
against MySpace arising out of a sexual assault committed by a nineteen-year-old who first 
contacted his fourteen-year-old victim via her MySpace profile). 
 328. H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006). Versions were reintroduced in the Senate and House 
in the 110th Congress and died. S. 49, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1120, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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block access to “commercial social networking website[s].”329 Under the list 
of factors that the Federal Communications Commission would have been 
required to use in defining that term, essentially all social network sites 
would have been covered.330
Other proposals go even farther. DOPA would have only applied to 
libraries receiving federal E-Rate funding and would have allowed librarians 
to enable social-network-site access upon patron request. An Illinois bill 
would have dropped both of those limits.
 
331 Bills in Georgia332 and North 
Carolina,333 along with a broad coalition of state attorneys general, would 
have threatened social network sites with legal action for not preventing 
minors from signing up.334 (For now, the states’ agreements with both 
MySpace335 and Facebook336 stop short of keeping kids off the sites.337
The first problem with trying to keep people (especially teens) off of 
social network sites is that it doesn’t work. Friendster originally didn’t allow 
users under eighteen to sign up, but that didn’t stop users under eighteen 
) 
 
 329. H.R. 1120, § 3(a). 
 330. Id. § 3(c). Commentators have observed that the definition—and similar ones offered 
in similar state bills—could encompass not just MySpace but also Wikipedia and many other 
websites with social network features. See, e.g., Adam Thierer, Would Your Favorite Website Be 
Banned By DOPA?, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Mar. 10, 2007), http://techliberation.com/ 
2007/03/10/would-your-favorite-website-be-banned-by-dopa/ (listing websites that DOPA 
would affect, including USAToday.com, CBS Sportsline, and many others). 
 331. S.B. 1682, 95th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2007). 
 332. S.B. 59, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007). 
 333. S.B. 132, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007). The bill did eventually pass but was 
amended to eliminate provisions that created liability for allowing minors to sign up for social 
network sites. 
 334. See Jennifer Medina, States Ponder Laws to Keep Web Predators from Children, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 6, 2007, § 1, at 37 (reporting that many states are pushing through legislation aimed at 
protecting children by imposing age verification requirements). 
 335. Press Release, Roy Cooper, N.C. Attorney Gen., AG Cooper Announces Landmark 
Agreement to Protect Kids Online (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentStreamer 
Client?directory=PressReleases/&file=AG%20Cooper%20MySpace%20agreement.pdf. 
 336. Joint Statement on Key Principles of Social Networking Sites Safety (May 8, 2008), 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/Facebook-Joint-Statement.pdf. 
 337. The “voluntary” steps that MySpace has agreed to take in trying to keep convicted sex 
offenders off the site are themselves worrisome from a privacy point of view. The site checks its 
membership rolls against a database of known sex offenders and deletes their accounts. See 
Story & Stone, supra note 52. It also gave their names and addresses to the attorneys general. Id. 
These broad restrictions—as enforced by MySpace with minimal due process protections for the 
individuals whose profiles are removed—are part and parcel of the increasingly comprehensive 
surveillance now being directed at sex offenders. See Patricia A. Powers, Note, Making a Spectacle 
of Panopticism: A Theoretical Evaluation of Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 38 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 1049, 1057–58 (2004). They also sweep up many people who are not significant threats to 
anyone’s safety online. See Kevin Poulsen, Banned MySpace Sex Offender: Why Me?, THREAT LEVEL, 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/05/banned_myspace_.html (May 21, 2007) 
(discussing a registered sex offender’s troubles in obtaining a MySpace account even though he 
claimed to have been clean for nine years with no intent of committing another sex crime). 
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from signing up by lying about their ages.338 That shouldn’t be surprising. 
People want to use socially compelling technologies, so they’ll look for ways 
to circumvent any obstacles thrown up to stop them. State attorneys general 
consistently call for social network sites to use age verification technologies, 
but age verification is no silver bullet either. In its opinion striking down the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Supreme Court held that there 
was “no effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user” on the 
Internet.339 There still isn’t.340
The impossibility of keeping teens off social network sites points to a 
deeper reason why it’s a bad idea to try. In danah boyd’s words, “[O]nline 
access provides a whole new social realm for youth.”
 
341 She traces a set of 
overlapping trends that have pushed teens into age-segregated spaces while 
simultaneously subjecting them to pervasive adult surveillance and depriving 
them of agency in roles other than as consumers.342 For them, social online 
media provide an essential “networked public”: a space in which they can 
define themselves, explore social roles, and engage publicly.343 These are 
compelling social benefits for social-network-site users of all ages.344 We 
shouldn’t deprive ourselves of these profoundly social technologies.345
F. DATA “OWNERSHIP” 
 
Some people think that the biggest problems with social network sites 
are closure and lock-in.346 When users can’t easily carry their digital 
identities with them from one site to another, it’s much harder for new 
entrants to compete with an entrenched incumbent.347
 
 338. boyd & Heer, supra note 62, § 3.1. 
 When that happens, 
users suffer. As Edwards and Brown put it, “Users will put up with a bad deal 
 339. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997), quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 
(E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 340. See ADAM THIERER, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., PROGRESS ON POINT RELEASE 14.5, 
SOCIAL NETWORKING AND AGE VERIFICATION: MANY HARD QUESTIONS; NO EASY SOLUTIONS 3 
(2007), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.5ageverification.pdf (“Perfect age 
verification is a quixotic objective”). 
 341. boyd, supra note 86, at 136. 
 342. Id. at 137–38. 
 343. Id. 
 344. See generally MIZUKO ITO ET AL., MACARTHUR FOUND., LIVING AND LEARNING WITH NEW 
MEDIA: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE DIGITAL YOUTH PROJECT (2008), http://digitalyouth. 
ischool.berkeley.edu/files/report/digitalyouth-WhitePaper.pdf. 
 345. See Anita Ramasastry, Why the Delete Online Predators Act Won’t Delete Predatory Behavior, 
FINDLAW, Aug. 7, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20060807.html (arguing that 
DOPA would increase the digital divide). 
 346. See, e.g., Michael Geist, Getting Social Network Sites to Socialize, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 13, 
2007 (calling for social-network-site interoperability); Jason Kottke, Facebook Is the New AOL, 
KOTTKE.ORG (June 29, 2007), http://kottke.org/07/06/facebook-is-the-new-aol (calling 
Facebook a “walled garden”). 
 347. See Picker, supra note 257, at 15–16. 
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rather than make the effort of replicating all their personal data and 
‘friends’ connections elsewhere.”348 Some see this “bad deal” as a form of 
exploitative unpaid labor;349 others think that the lack of market discipline 
means that social network sites don’t pay enough attention to privacy.350 
Users themselves want a seamless online experience; reentering information 
from scratch is a big hassle.351
These are serious concerns, but far too many people have fallen into 
the trap of thinking that we should respond by giving users “ownership” over 
“their” information on a social network site.
 
352 The ownership frame thinks 
that the problem is that because Facebook currently “owns” all user data, it 
can squelch user attempts to leave.353
Consider the story of Plaxo’s screen-scraper.
 Thus, goes the argument, users should 
“own” their personal information—retaining the rights to export the 
information, delete it from Facebook, and feed it into one of Facebook’s 
competitors. Unfortunately, while user data ownership might help with the 
competitive lock-in problem, the privacy consequences would be disastrous. 
Think of it this way: If you and I are contacts, is that fact your personal 
information or mine? Giving me the “ownership” to take what I know about 
you with me to another site violates your privacy. 
354 Plaxo, a contacts 
manager with strong social network features, encouraged Facebook users to 
change horses midstream by providing a tool for users to import their piece 
of the social graph from Facebook into Plaxo. The tool worked by loading 
Facebook profiles and extracting the relevant information from them 
directly. Blogger Robert Scoble tried it out and promptly had his account 
banned for violating Facebook’s terms of service.355
 
 348. Edwards & Brown, supra note 143, at 23. 
 
 349. See Trebor Scholz, What the MySpace Generation Should Know About Working for Free, 
COLLECTIVATE.NET, Apr. 3, 2007, http://www.collectivate.net/journalisms/2007/4/3/what-the-
myspace-generation-should-know-about-working-for-free.html. 
 350. See Ruben Rodrigues, You’ve Been Poked: Privacy in the Era of Facebook, SCITECH LAW., 
Summer 2008, at 18–19. 
 351. See Erica Naone, Who Owns Your Friends?, TECH. REV., July–Aug. 2008, https://www. 
technologyreview.com/Infotech/20920/ (“huge burden”). 
 352. See, e.g., John Battelle, It’s Time for Services on the Web to Compete on More Than Data, 
SEARCHBLOG, http://battellemedia.com/archives/004189.php (Jan. 4, 2008) (“Imagine a world 
where my identity and my social graph is truly *mine*, and is represented in a machine 
readable manner.”). Many people use ownership rhetoric uncritically, even though the nature 
of the property allegedly to be “owned” is unclear. E.g., Josh Quittner, Who Owns Your Address 
Book?, FORTUNE, Feb. 12, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/11/technology/quittner_ 
address.fortune/index.htm (“My contacts should belong to me.”) Does that mean that 
Quittner’s contacts also own him? 
 353. See Joseph Smarr et al., A Bill of Rights for Users of the Social Web, OPEN SOCIAL WEB, 
http://opensocialweb.org/2007/09/05/bill-of-rights/ (Sept. 5, 2007) (listing “ownership” as 
one of three “fundamental rights”). 
 354. See Naone, supra note 351. 
 355. Specifically, the Plaxo tool gathered email addresses, which Facebook users can put on 
their profile pages, but which aren’t exposed through Facebook’s public API. See Michael 
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Facebook’s decision makes sense from a privacy perspective.356
Thus, while data portability may reduce vertical power imbalances 
between users and social network sites, it creates horizontal privacy trouble. 
Everyone who has access to “portable” information on social network site A 
is now empowered to move that information to social network site B. In the 
process, they can strip the information of whatever legal, technical, or social 
constraints applied to it in social network site A. Perhaps social network site 
B has similar restrictions, but it need not. Unless we’re prepared to dictate 
the feature set that every social network site must have, mandatory data-
portability rules create a privacy race to the bottom for any information 
subject to them. 
 If you 
agreed to be Scoble’s contact on Facebook, you had Facebook’s privacy rules 
in mind. You may have tweaked your Facebook account settings to limit 
access, relied on Facebook’s enforcement of community norms, and 
presented yourself in ways that make sense in the social context of Facebook. 
You probably didn’t have in mind being Scoble’s contact on Plaxo. If he can 
unilaterally export his piece of the social graph from Facebook to Plaxo, he 
can override your graph-based privacy settings, end-run Facebook’s social 
norms, and rip your identity out of the context you crafted it for. In other 
words, Robert Scoble’s screen scraper is an insult to thousands of people’s 
contextual privacy expectations. 
For this reason, we should also be extremely cautious about technical 
infrastructures for social network portability, like Google’s OpenSocial,357 
and APIs from MySpace358 and Facebook.359 Personal information is only as 
secure as the least secure link in the chain through which such information 
passes. One study found that ninety percent of Facebook Applications 
requested access to more personal information than they needed.360 A bug 
in data portability between MySpace and Yahoo! exposed Paris Hilton’s and 
Lindsay Lohan’s “private” MySpace pages to anyone with a Yahoo! account, 
complete with plenty of photos.361
 
Arrington, Plaxo Flubs It, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 3, 2008), 
 As social-network-site data becomes more 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/01/ 
03/plaxo-flubs-it/. 
 356. Juan Carlos Perez, Facebook Privacy Chief: Data Portability Dangers Overlooked, INFOWORLD 
(Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/02/08/Facebook-privacy-chief-Data-
portability-dangers-overlooked_1.html. 
 357. OpenSocial, GOOGLE CODE, http://code.google.com/apis/opensocial/. 
 358. Data Availability, MYSPACE DEVELOPER PLATFORM, http://developer.myspace.com/ 
community/myspace/dataavailability.aspx. 
 359. Facebook Connect, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, http://developers.facebook.com/connect. 
php. 
 360. Adrienne Felt & David Evans, Privacy Protection for Social Networking APIs § 4.1, http:// 
www.cs.virginia.edu/felt/privacybyproxy.pdf. 
 361. See Owen Thomas, Paris Hilton, Lindsay Lohan Private Pics Exposed by Yahoo Hack, 
VALLEYWAG (June 3, 2008), http://valleywag.com/5012543/paris-hilton-lindsay-lohan-private-
pics-exposed-by-yahoo-hack. 
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portable, it also becomes less secure—and thus less private. The supposedly 
privacy-promoting solution so badly misunderstands the social nature of 
relationships on social network sites that it destroys the privacy it means to 
save. 
* * * 
The strategies detailed in this Part fail because they don’t engage with 
Facebook’s social dynamics. People have compelling social reasons to use 
Facebook, and those same social factors lead them to badly misunderstand 
the privacy risks involved. “Solutions” that treat Facebook as a rogue actor 
that must be restrained from sharing personal information miss the point 
that people use Facebook because it lets them share personal information. 
IV. WHAT WILL (SOMETIMES) WORK 
Recognizing that Facebook’s users are highly engaged but often 
confused about privacy risks suggests turning the problem around. Instead 
of focusing on Facebook—trying to dictate when, how, and with whom it 
shares personal information—we should focus on the users. It’s their 
decisions to upload information about themselves that set the trouble in 
motion. The smaller we can make the gap between the privacy they expect 
and the privacy they get, the fewer bad calls they’ll make. 
This prescription is not a panacea. Some people walk knowingly into 
likely privacy trouble. Others make bad decisions that are probably beyond 
the law’s power to alter (teens, I’m looking at you). There will always be a 
need to keep companies from making privacy promises and then 
deliberately breaking them. Even more importantly, the many cases of 
interpersonal conflict we’ve seen can’t be fixed simply by setting 
expectations appropriately. People have different desires—that’s the point—
and someone’s hopes are bound to be dashed. 
Still, there are ways that law can incrementally promote privacy on 
social network sites, and we ought not to let the fact that they’re not 
complete solutions stop us from improving matters where we reasonably 
can. Some of these suggestions are jobs for law; they ask regulators to 
restrain social network sites and their users from behaving in privacy-
harming ways. Others are pragmatic, ethical advice for social-network-site 
operators; they can often implement reforms more effectively than law’s 
heavy hand could. They have in common the fact that they take social 
dynamics seriously. 
A.  PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TORTS 
For legal purposes, there’s often a sharp dichotomy between “secret” 
and “public” information. Courts sometimes seem to believe that once a 
personal fact is known by even a few people, there’s no longer a privacy 
interest in it. Scholars have sharply criticized this dichotomy, arguing that in 
everyday life, we rely on social norms and architectural constraints to reveal 
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information to certain groups while keeping it from others.362 Lauren 
Gelman persuasively argues that publicly accessible information is often not 
actually public, because it’s practically obscure and social norms keep it that 
way.363 (She gives the example of a blog by a breast-cancer survivor; she’s 
speaking to a community of other women who’ve had breast cancer, even if 
the blog is visible to anyone.364
Facebook provides a great illustration of why the secret/public 
dichotomy is misleading. If I hide my profile from everyone except a close 
group of contacts, and one of them puts everything from it on a public web 
page seen by thousands of people, including a stalker I’d been trying to 
avoid, my faithless contact is the one who made the information “public,” 
not me. The same would be true if Facebook were to make all profiles 
completely public tomorrow. They weren’t secret—they were on Facebook, 
after all—but they were still often effectively private. 
) 
Lior Strahilevitz’s social-networks theory of privacy provides a better 
middle ground.365 He draws on the sociological and mathematical study of 
networks to show that some information is likely to spread widely 
throughout a social network and other information is not. He invites courts 
to look at the actual structure of real social networks and the structure of 
information flow in them to decide whether information would have 
become widely known, even if a particular defendant hadn’t made it so.366
Social network sites—where the social network itself is made visible—
are a particularly appropriate place for the kind of analysis Strahilevitz 
recommends. Because six of his proposed factors require examining 
features of the network itself—e.g. “prevalence of ties and supernodes”—
they’re substantially easier to evaluate on Facebook than offline.
 
367
In particular, while the privacy settings chosen by the original user 
shouldn’t be conclusive, they’re good evidence of how the plaintiff thought 
about the information at issue, and of how broadly it was known and 
knowable before the defendant spread it around. Where the defendant was 
a contact and learned the information through Facebook, we might also 
consider reviving the tort of breach of confidence, as Neil Richards and 
 Courts 
should therefore sometimes have the facts that they need to conclude that a 
piece of information, while “on Facebook,” remained private enough to 
support a public-disclosure-of-private-facts lawsuit along the lines Strahilevitz 
suggests. 
 
 362. See Nissenbaum, supra note 199, at 136–38 (discussing contextual integrity); see also 
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 42–44 (2004) (attacking the “secrecy paradigm”). 
 363. Gelman, supra note 177. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Strahilevitz, supra note 89, at 921. 
 366. Id. at 973–80. 
 367. Id. at 970–71. 
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Daniel Solove propose.368
The same idea should apply, but with a difference balance, when it 
comes to defining reasonable expectations of privacy for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.
 These torts are not appropriate in all situations—
de minimis non curat lex—but they’re a good legal arrow to have in our quiver 
for protecting online privacy. 
369 The police officer who logged into Facebook and 
saw that Marc Chiles and Adam Gartner were friends was like an undercover 
investigator pretending to be a student in the back row of a classroom, and 
it’s eminently reasonable to let the police use information that they gain this 
way. Similarly, under the third-party doctrine, a Facebook user who makes a 
fact known only to a small group of contacts has no Fourth Amendment 
grounds for complaint if one of those contacts reveals the fact to the 
police.370
B.  RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
 On the other hand, when users make privacy choices using 
Facebook’s technical controls, they’re expressing expectations about who 
will and won’t see their information, and society should treat those 
expectations as reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, when 
the police get the information by demanding it from Facebook the company 
(rather than by logging in as users or having someone log in for them), they 
should be required to present a search warrant. Drawing the line there 
appropriately recognizes the social construction of users’ expectations of 
privacy. 
William McGeveran’s point that Beacon and Social Ads appropriate the 
commercial value of users’ identities for marketing purposes bears 
repeating.371 We’re used to thinking of the right of publicity as a tool used 
by celebrities to monetize their fame. Beacon and Social Ads do the same 
thing on a smaller scale; by sticking purchase-triggered ads in News Feeds 
with users’ names and pictures, Facebook turns its users into shills. In one 
respect, it’s a brilliant innovation. If, as David Weinberger asserts, on the 
Internet everyone is famous to fifteen people,372
Just as with traditional celebrity endorsements, Facebook should be 
required to obtain the knowing consent of its users before it can use their 
personae for advertising. That’s not onerous. Users can meaningfully opt 
into Social Ads on a notification-by-notification basis; it would also be 
 Facebook has found a way 
to tap into the commercial value of this “Long Tail” of micro-celebrity. 
 
 368. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 156–58 (2007). 
 369. See generally Kerr, supra note 154 (discussing the “reasonable expectation” test in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 370. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564–66 
(2009) (describing and defending the third-party doctrine). 
 371. McGeveran, supra note 251. 
 372. DAVID WEINBERGER, SMALL PIECES LOOSELY JOINED 103–04 (2002). 
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reasonable to let them opt in on a source-by-source basis (e.g., “It’s okay to 
show an ad with my name and picture to my friends whenever I add a 
Favorite Book available at Amazon”). But consent to the program in general 
is meaningless; users can’t reasonably be asked to predict what new sites and 
services might become Facebook partners. Even worse is the way that 
Facebook launched Beacon: on an opt-out basis—with an ineffective opt-out 
at that. These facts ought to support suits under state right-of-publicity laws. 
A related concern is that people invest a lot of time and effort in their 
Facebook personae; to lose one’s profile can be a harsh blow.373 Facebook 
has been bad about deleting profiles without warning or explanation.374 
When Brandon Blatcher and his wife asked why their accounts had been 
deleted, they received the fearsome reply, “Unfortunately, we will not be 
able to reactivate this account for any reason. This decision is final.”375 
Facebook’s stated reason for kicking them off—it thought that they’d signed 
up under false names—is reasonable enough, but its application of that 
principle to the Blatchers leaves a lot to be desired. Facebook has an ethical 
obligation to institute better due process safeguards: at the very least, notice 
and an opportunity to be heard.376
C.  RELIABLE OPT-OUT 
 By allowing users to better direct how 
their profiles are used commercially, Facebook would further users’ interest 
in shaping their social identities. 
Many expectations about what will happen on a social network site are 
ambiguous and confused. People who haven’t completely thought through 
the logical consequences of their privacy preferences—and that’s pretty 
much all of us—can be surprised when some of those preferences turn out 
to be inconsistent. But there is one class of expectations that is reliable 
enough that the law should draw a simple, bright-line rule to enforce them. 
People who have chosen not to be on Facebook at all have made a clear 
statement of their privacy preferences and deserve to have that choice 
 
 373. See Baratunde Thurson, Facebook Follies (Or the Dangers of Investing in Someone Else’s 
Platform), GOODCRIMETHINK, http://baratunde.com/blog/archives/2007/08/facebook_ 
follies_or_the_dangers_of_investing_in_someone_elses_platform.html (Aug. 28, 2007) 
(describing how a comedian who regularly invited fans to follow him on Facebook lost his 
ability to contact them). 
 374. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Facebook Banishment and Due Process, CONCURRING OPINIONS, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/03/facebook_banish.html (Mar. 3, 2008) 
(describing the plight of one Facebook user who inexplicably had his profile deleted). 
 375. See Brandon Blatcher, What the Hell Facebook?, ASK METAFILTER, http://ask.metafilter. 
com/99021/What-the-hell-Facebook (Aug. 12, 2008). As the thread recounts, despite the take-
no-prisoners tone of this “final” decision, a Facebook protest led to their accounts being 
reinstated. Id. 
 376. Cf. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 
135–38 (2006) (discussing due process protections for people affected by search-engine-ranking 
decisions). 
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honored. Facebook’s past missteps illustrate why. Until February 2008, it was 
nearly impossible to delete one’s Facebook account; the data associated with 
it would remain on Facebook’s servers even after a user “deactivated” the 
account.377 Facebook figured that some users who left would want to come 
back and reopen their old accounts, a rationale that doesn’t justify trapping 
those users who really do want to leave for good.378 Facebook told one 
blogger that to close his account, he’d need to delete each contact, Wall 
post, and so on by hand—all 2500 of them.379 Facebook relented and added 
a “delete” option,380 but even that was plagued by bugs at first: some 
“deleted” profiles were still visible, including contact lists and 
Applications.381 Facebook may also have violated this principle by gathering 
information on people even before they’ve signed up. For a while in July 
2008, Facebook had a drop-down option to show users their “Friends 
without Facebook profiles.”382 Theories vary as to where Facebook gathered 
the names, but the most plausible explanation seems to be that it took the 
names of non-Facebook users from tagged photos. Data suction like this—
Facebook can also gather names from current users’ address books and 
instant messenger buddy lists383
By way of contrast, Facebook now gets it mostly right when a user tags a 
photo of a non-user. It prompts the user to supply the non-user’s email 
address. The email that the non-user then receives from Facebook 
informing them of the tag offers not just the chance to untag the photo, but 
also to opt out of future contact from Facebook.
—is worrisome, because non-users have 
never seen Facebook’s privacy policies and have had no reasonable chance 
to opt out. 
384
 
 377. See Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership on Facebook? Just Try Breaking Free, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2008, at C1. 
 
 378. See PIPEDA Facebook Complaint, supra note 290, at 25–27 (arguing that the lack of a 
delete option violated PIPEDA). 
 379. Steven Mansour, 2504 Steps to Closing Your Facebook Account, STEVENMANSOUR.COM, 
http://www.stevenmansour.com/writings/2007/jul/23/2342/2504_steps_to_closing_your_face
book_account (July 24, 2007) (describing the author’s efforts to close his Facebook account). 
 380. See Maria Aspan, Quitting Facebook Gets Easier, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at C1. 
 381. See Maria Aspan, After Stumbling, Facebook Finds a Working Eraser, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2008, at C5. 
 382. See Nick O’Neill, Facebook Starts Recommending Friends Not on Site, ALLFACEBOOK, http:// 
www.allfacebook.com/2008/07/facebook-starts-recommending-friends-not-on-site/ (July 26, 
2008). 
 383. Friends, FACEBOOK, http://www.new.facebook.com/help.php?page=441. 
 384. This is not to say that the opt-out option is always successful in practice. Facebook’s 
description of the feature would seem to imply that the subject can’t untag the photo without 
signing up for Facebook. In my (admittedly brief) tests, I found that I couldn’t even see the 
photo without signing up for Facebook. Also, query whether this opt-out is prompted by 
Facebook’s CAN-SPAM obligations. See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3)–(5) (Supp. 2004) (requiring 
commercial e-mails to contain opt-out provisions for consumers). 
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The correct general rule extends this principle in two ways. First, 
Facebook should proactively offer this sort of an opt-out to any non-user as 
soon as it acquires enough information about them to be able to contact 
them (e.g., an email address or IM screen name);385
Lillian Edwards and Ralph Brown’s idea of more privacy-preserving 
default settings also has value in specific clear cases where users are likely to 
want heightened privacy. I’ve been told
 it should also purge 
from its servers any other information linked with the email address whose 
owner has opted out. Deliberately staying off of Facebook has an 
unambiguous social meaning, and Facebook should respect the request. 
386 about two different people who 
ended long-term relationships and wanted to change their Facebook 
relationship status without notifying the world. Both of them spent a long 
time poring through Facebook’s privacy settings so that it would stay strictly 
confidential when they made the switch. In both cases, the “X changed her 
relationship status to single” announcement was broadcast to their entire 
networks. There’s no need here to have a larger argument about the 
usability of Facebook’s privacy interface, not when a simpler rule would 
suffice. Facebook shouldn’t send announcements about the ends of 
relationships unless the users explicitly click on a “post this to my News 
Feed” button. Breakups should be opt-in, not opt-out. Similarly, Facebook 
currently treats joining a geographical network as permission to share your 
profile with anyone else in the network. That’s a dangerous default: photos 
of Bono from U2 frolicking with two nineteen-year-olds in bikinis were 
effectively made public when one of the girls joined the New York network, 
which has over a million members.387
D. PREDICTABILITY 
 
In the Introduction, I made fun of the idea that cars should be declared 
unreasonably dangerous because people injure themselves ghost riding the 
whip. But in a more limited way, this idea does have some value. Suppose 
that the Powell Motors Canyonero unpredictably lurches from side to side 
about forty seconds after the driver takes his or her foot off the gas pedal. 
This is a bad product feature by any measure, but it turns ghost riding from 
a dangerous sport into a positively suicidal one. Since manufacturers are 
generally strictly (and non-waivably) liable for injuries proximately caused by 
a defectively designed product, it might make sense to hold Powell Motors 
 
 385. Cf. PIPEDA Facebook Complaint, supra note 290, at 28–29. CIPPIC argues that 
Facebook should need permission to obtain non-users’ consent when pictures of them are 
uploaded; the “as soon as contact is possible” principle provides a necessary qualification to that 
argument. 
 386. In confidence, for reasons that will become apparent. 
 387. See Bono’s Bikini Party Photos Exposed by Facebook Privacy Flaw, SOPHOS, http://www. 
sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2008/10/bono.html (Oct. 29, 2008). 
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liable for ghost riding accidents caused by Canyonero lurches.388
Facebook, however, changes in unpredictable and privacy-threatening 
ways with disconcerting frequency. News Feed is the most famous example, 
an overnight change that instantly made highly salient what had previously 
been practically obscure. As danah boyd explains, Facebook users were like 
partygoers who felt “protected by the acoustics” of the loud music at a 
party.
 A well-
designed product doesn’t change what it’s doing in unpredictable and 
dangerous ways. 
389
What should the law do about lurches? Users’ “consent” to the new 
patterns of data flow is questionable. There’s a strong argument that lurches 
of this sort constitute a new “use” or “purpose” under privacy schemes like 
the European Data Protection Directive
 A reasonable voice for talking to a friend over loud music becomes 
an unreasonable scream when the music stops—and everyone can hear the 
end of your sentence. Facebook users have since embraced their News 
Feeds, but the transition was a privacy lurch. 
390 or the Canadian PIPEDA,391
An explicit consumer-protection approach is promising. On this way of 
looking at things, the initial design of the system is a representation to users 
that information they supply will be used in certain ways; by changing the 
service in a fundamental, privacy-breaching way, the site also breaches that 
implicit representation. The FTC action against Sony/BMG for distributing 
CDs that surreptitiously installed spyware on consumers’ computers provides 
a useful model.
 for 
which fresh consent would be required. It’s harder to make such an 
argument under U.S. law, since the lack of a comprehensive information-
privacy statute means that Facebook needs no permission in the first place to 
collect personal information. 
392 There too, consumers were confronted with a product 
that threatened their privacy by failing to conform to their legitimate 
expectations about how it would work.393
Similar reasoning ought to apply to the rollout of a service like Beacon. 
There’s not much wrong with Beacon as long as everyone involved knows it’s 
there and can turn it off if they want. But Beacon was completely 
unforeseeable from a user standpoint. There was no precedent for two 
unrelated websites to realize that they had a user in common and start 
 
 
 388. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (basic liability); Id. 
§ 2 (design defects and foreseeable harm); Id. § 10 (failure to warn); Id. § 15 (causation); Id. 
§ 18 (non-waivability). 
 389. boyd, supra note 35. 
 390. See Edwards & Brown, supra note 143, at 14–16. 
 391. See PIPEDA Facebook Complaint, supra note 290, at 24. 
 392. In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, No. C-4195, 2007 FTC LEXIS 83 (June 29, 2007). 
 393. See generally Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the 
Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1158–77 
(2007). 
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funneling information from one to a highly visible place on the other. That 
unannounced design change made both Facebook and its partner sites 
unreasonably dangerous services. 
That Facebook could have done better with News Feed and Beacon is 
demonstrated by its own actions in rolling out public profiles. It made an 
announcement several weeks before opening the profiles up to search 
engines, giving users an opportunity to uncheck the appropriate box. 394 
Even so, such a large cultural shift—danah boyd observes that “Facebook 
differentiated itself by being private” and walled off from the Internet at 
large395—should have been opt-in, rather than opt-out. Moreover, Facebook 
didn’t give its users advance warning about the public profile pages, only 
about their exposure to search engines, and one blogger has produced 
evidence suggesting that Facebook may well have made the announcement 
at least several weeks after enabling the public profiles.396
Consumer-protection rules are not a cure-all. There’s a subtle but 
crucial difference between a user’s “consent” to Beacon and her “consent” 
to let her employer see photos of her in a drunken stupor. We can save the 
former from her folly by declaring the consent fictitious and rewriting a 
contract, but we can’t save the latter by meddling with the contract.
 
397
E. NO CHAIN LETTERS 
 
Facebook would have been perfectly happy to take the photos down if she 
asked, but she didn’t. This is not a case about misleading the consumer. 
Social lurches, on the other hand, are inherently misleading. 
We’ve seen that social network sites spread virally through real social 
networks. Once they have spread, they themselves provide a fertile 
environment for memes and add-ons to spread rapidly through the social 
network of users. There’s an obvious network effect at work; the more users 
a given site or Application has, the more engaging it is. 
There’s also an obvious conflict of interest here. For example, Hubert 
would like Hermes to join him in using HyperPoke, even if Hermes himself 
wouldn’t enjoy it. Under most circumstances, the network effect and the 
conflict of interest are inseparable; they’re both irreducibly social, and the 
best we can do is to leave it up to Hubert and Hermes to negotiate any 
 
 394. Phillip Fung, Public Search Listings on Facebook, FACEBOOK BLOG, http://blog.facebook. 
com/blog.php?post=2963412130 (Sept. 5, 2007). 
 395. danah boyd, SNS Visibility Norms (A Response to Scoble), APOPHENIA, http://www. 
zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2007/09/09/sns_visibility.html (Sept. 9, 2007). 
 396. Danny Sullivan, 4 Questions and Answers You Should Know About Facebook’s Public Search 
Listings, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, http://searchengineland.com/070911-103851.php (Sept. 11, 
2007). 
 397. Cf. Edwards & Brown, supra note 143, at 19 (discussing “online consumer contracts” 
that courts have declared void or voidable for unconscionability). 
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tension between themselves. Most of the actual operations of viral word-of-
mouth marketing are necessarily beyond regulation, and should be. 
Matters may be different, however, when Hubert has an interest in 
Hermes’s participation that goes beyond the pleasure of his company. If 
Hubert is being paid to convince Hermes to sign up, he has an incentive to 
treat Hermes as an object, rather than as a friend. HyperPoke is subverting 
the relationship; that’s bad for Hermes and for their friendship.398 There’s a 
particular danger that a social-network-site feature could be “social” in the 
same way that a multi-level marketing scheme or a chain letter is: by bribing 
or threatening current users to use every social trick in their book to bring 
in new ones.399
Fortunately, in its role overseeing the Applications it allows to run, 
Facebook now wisely prohibits “incentivized invites.”
 
400 Before the policy 
went into effect, Application developers would sometimes reward users for 
inviting others (e.g., you can use HyperPoke as soon as you join, but your 
character can’t be more than a Level 1 Nudger until you’ve invited ten other 
users). Now, an Application may not “[r]equire that users invite, notify, or 
otherwise communicate with one or more friends to gain access to any 
feature, information, or portion of the application . . . .”401
This is a useful general principle: it’s presumptively illegitimate to bribe 
users to take advantage of their social networks. True, there’s a fine line 
between these “artificial” incentives and the “natural” incentives of 
inherently social Applications, but Facebook is doing the right thing by 
banning viral incentives that have no legitimate connection to the 
Application’s actual functionality. Regulators should watch out for the 
deliberate exploitation of social dynamics and, where appropriate, prohibit 
such practices. 
 
F. USER-DRIVEN EDUCATION 
Education about the privacy risks of Facebook can also help. Although 
people are always going to make mistakes at the margin and have privacy-
affecting disputes with each other, there are some basic facts about how 
social network sites work that people don’t always appreciate. Education can 
 
 398. Cf. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83 (2006) 
(arguing for mandatory sponsorship disclosure of “stealth marketing”). 
 399. See generally Sergio Pareja, Sales Gone Wild: Will the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule Put an 
End to Pyramid Marketing Schemes?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 83 (2008) (describing the history and 
limits of the FTC’s efforts to curb abusive business opportunity schemes). 
 400. See Karl Bunyan, Incentivized Invites No Longer Allowed on the Facebook Platform, INSIDE 
FACEBOOK, http://www.insidefacebook.com/2008/08/13/incentivized-invites-no-longer-
allowed-by-facebook/ (Aug. 13, 2008). 
 401. Platform Policy § 2.6, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS WIKI, http://wiki.developers.facebook. 
com/index.php?title=Platform_Policy&oldid=14244 (July 21, 2008). 
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help them learn these essentials the easy way, rather than from painful 
experience.402
That education, however, needs to be rooted in the communities it 
targets. When outsiders try to lecture on the dangers of Facebook, they often 
end up talking past the groups that they’re trying to reach. Education via 
privacy policy, we’ve seen, is wholly ineffective. So, too, are dry statements of 
fact by distant authority figures. Even worse is the “education” that a 
Cheyenne police officer offered to an assembly of high-school students. He 
pulled up one student’s MySpace page and claimed that he’d shared her 
information with an imprisoned sexual predator. She ran from the room in 
tears as the police officer told the students that the predator would now be 
masturbating to her picture.
 
403
An inspirational model of culturally appropriate education comes from 
the work of anthropologist Dwight Conquergood in the Ban Vinai refugee 
camp in the mid-1980s.
 This wasn’t education about privacy 
violations, this was a privacy violation. 
404
Instead of trying to disabuse the Hmong of their cultural assumptions, 
Conquergood embraced them. He held parades in which allegorical figures 
drawing on elements of Hmong folklore and costume—such as Mother 
Clean, a gigantic grinning puppet—explained disease-prevention essentials 
through song, dance, and proverbs.
 Western doctors in the camp had difficulty 
explaining the health risks of rabies and poor refuse disposal to Hmong 
refugees. The Hmong were suspicious of the doctors, whose cultural 
practices—drawing blood, asking intrusive questions, and demanding that 
patients undress—clashed with Hmong cultural practices. 
405 Conquergood succeeded where the 
doctors had failed; after a rabies-prevention parade, thousands of refugees 
brought in dogs for vaccination. Conquergood attributed much of the 
parades’ appeal to the way the Hmong actors improvised and rewrote the 
messages to make them culturally appropriate.406
Cultural appropriateness is particularly important for younger users. On 
the unfortunate but probably justified assumption that society will not 
 
 
 402. Compare Tim O’Reilly, Social Graph Visibility Akin to Pain Reflex, O’REILLY RADAR, http:// 
radar.oreilly.com/2008/02/social-graph-visibility-akin-t.html (Feb. 2, 2008) (“It’s a lot like the 
evolutionary value of pain. Search creates feedback loops that allow us to learn from and modify 
our behavior.”), with danah boyd, Just Because We Can, Doesn’t Mean We Should, APOPHENIA, 
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2008/02/04/just_because_we.html (Feb. 4, 
2008) (“I’m not jumping up and down at the idea of being in the camp who dies because the 
healthy think that infecting society with viruses to see who survives is a good idea.”). 
 403. See Hallie Woods & David Persons, MySpace Lecture Generates Outrage, FORT COLLINS 
COLORADOAN, Aug. 21, 2008, at 1A. 
 404. See ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU FALL DOWN 32–38 (1998) 
(describing Conquergood’s work). 
 405. See Dwight Conquergood, Health Theatre in a Hmong Refugee Camp: Performance, 
Communication, and Culture, 32 DRAMA REV. 174, 174–203 (1988). 
 406. Id. at 182–84, 203. 
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become more tolerant of youthful indiscretions any time soon, teens and 
college students would be better off with a better understanding of the ways 
that persistent postings can return to haunt them later. Teens are 
sophisticated (if not always successful) at negotiating boundaries of obscurity 
with respect to present surveillance from their elders; the challenge is to help 
them be similarly sophisticated in dealing with future surveillance.407 A 
critical theme of boyd’s work, however, is that social network sites are hugely 
popular with young users because they fit so effectively into the social 
patterns of teenage and young-adult life.408
One possible Mother Clean in American society may be student-run 
college newspapers. The pages of college newspapers have been peppered 
with editorials and articles explaining how embarrassing photos and profiles 
are fodder for employers.
 Warnings about the dangers of 
MySpace will wash right over them unless those warnings resonate with lived 
experience. 
409 Indeed, college newspapers were generally on 
the scene earlier than the mainstream media: the October 2005 expulsion of 
a Fisher College student for creating a Facebook group targeting a campus 
security officer was shortly followed by articles about Facebook and privacy 
in at least a dozen college newspapers.410
It could also help in educating regulators themselves. Conquergood 
explained that the Ban Vinai health workers needed to learn just as much 
from their patients as vice-versa, stating “The ideal is for the two cultures, 
refugees’ and relief workers’, to enter into a productive and mutually 
invigorating dialog . . . .”
 Reaching out to student-
newspaper editors may be an effective way of getting appropriate warnings 
heard by the people who need to hear them. 
411
V. CONCLUSION 
 For regulators, studying the social dynamics of 
Facebook is the essential first step in that dialog. 
In his recent book Here Comes Everybody, Clay Shirky, the great theorist of 
online social media, had this to say about blog audiences: 
[W]hy would anyone put such drivel out in public? 
It’s simple. They’re not talking to you. 
We misread these seemingly inane posts because we’re so unused 
to seeing written material in public that isn’t intended for us. The 
people posting messages to one another in small groups are doing 
 
 407. boyd, supra note 86, at 131–34. 
 408. See generally id. 
 409. See, e.g., Jilian Gundling, Facebook: The Facetime That Can Lose You a Job, DARTMOUTH, 
http://thedartmouth.com/2007/11/02/arts/jobsandfacebook/ (Nov. 2, 2007). 
 410. See Jones & Soltren, supra note 284, at 30 (describing the incident at Fisher College 
and the “explosion” of cautionary articles that followed). 
 411. Conquergood, supra note 405, at 202. 
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a different kind of communicating than people posting messages 
for hundreds or thousands of people to read.412
This short passage captures everything that makes it hard to set sensible 
policy for new social media. Their norms are surprising. Their messages are 
heavily context-dependent. Their users think socially, not logically. It’s easy 
for outsiders to misunderstand what’s really going on. 
 
This may sound like a pessimistic message, but it isn’t. The deeper point 
of Here Comes Everybody is that new online media and the social networks that 
coalesce around them are comprehensible, that there is an underlying social 
logic to how they work. Policymakers who are willing to take the time to 
understand those social dynamics will find their efforts rewarded. 
This Article has confirmed the essential truth of Shirky’s lesson by 
applying it to Facebook and other social network sites. We’ve seen that the 
same three social imperatives—identity, relationships, and community—
recur again and again on these sites. Users want and need to socialize, and 
they act in privacy-risking ways because of it. We cannot and should not beat 
these social urges out of people; we cannot and should not stop people from 
acting on them. We can and should help them understand the 
consequences of their socializing, make available safer ways to do it, and 
protect them from sociality hijackers. There are better and worse ways to do 
these things, and this Article has attempted to start a conversation about 
what those ways are. 
Ultimately, this is a story about people doing things together, which really 
means it’s a story about people. New technologies matter when they change 
the dynamics of how people do things together; the challenge for 
technology law is always to adapt itself to these changing dynamics. Laws are 
made for people, and we lose sight of that fact at our peril. Social 
networking, like ghost riding the whip, can be a dangerous activity; if we 
wish to address that danger, our inquiry must start with the people engaged 
in it. This is their story, the story of people taking a technology and making 
it their own. As Shirky wrote over a decade ago, “[t]he human condition 
infects everything it touches.”413
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